CVPR 2023 论文列表

Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition

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2,359篇论文

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Dynamic Generative Targeted Attacks With Pattern Injection

Weiwei Feng, Nanqing Xu, Tianzhu Zhang, Yongdong Zhang

展开摘要

Adversarial attacks can evaluate model robustness and have been of great concerns in recent years. Among various attacks, targeted attacks aim at misleading victim models to output adversary-desired predictions, which are more challenging and threatening than untargeted ones. Existing targeted attacks can be roughly divided into instancespecific and instance-agnostic attacks. Instance-specific attacks craft adversarial examples via iterative gradient updating on the specific instance. In contrast, instanceagnostic attacks learn a universal perturbation or a generative model on the global dataset to perform attacks. However they rely too much on the classification boundary of substitute models, ignoring the realistic distribution of target class, which may result in limited targeted attack performance. And there is no attempt to simultaneously combine the information of the specific instance and the global dataset. To deal with these limitations, we first conduct an analysis via a causal graph and propose to craft transferable targeted adversarial examples by injecting target patterns. Based on this analysis, we introduce a generative attack model composed of a cross-attention guided convolution module and a pattern injection module. Concretely, the former adopts a dynamic convolution kernel and a static convolution kernel for the specific instance and the global dataset, respectively, which can inherit the advantages of both instance-specific and instance-agnostic attacks. And the pattern injection module utilizes a pattern prototype to encode target patterns, which can guide the generation of targeted adversarial examples. Besides, we also provide rigorous theoretical analysis to guarantee the effectiveness of our method. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method show superior performance than 10 existing adversarial attacks against 13 models.

Poster
Defending Against Patch-Based Backdoor Attacks on Self-Supervised Learning

Ajinkya Tejankar, Maziar Sanjabi, Qifan Wang, Sinong Wang, Hamed Firooz, Hamed Pirsiavash, Liang Tan

展开摘要

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Poster
DartBlur: Privacy Preservation With Detection Artifact Suppression

Baowei Jiang, Bing Bai, Haozhe Lin, Yu Wang, Yuchen Guo, LU FANG

展开摘要

Nowadays, privacy issue has become a top priority when training AI algorithms. Machine learning algorithms are expected to benefit our daily life, while personal information must also be carefully protected from exposure. Facial information is particularly sensitive in this regard. Multiple datasets containing facial information have been taken offline, and the community is actively seeking solutions to remedy the privacy issues. Existing methods for privacy preservation can be divided into blur-based and face replacement-based methods. Owing to the advantages of review convenience and good accessibility, blur-based based methods have become a dominant choice in practice. However, blur-based methods would inevitably introduce training artifacts harmful to the performance of downstream tasks. In this paper, we propose a novel De-artifact Blurring(DartBlur) privacy-preserving method, which capitalizes on a DNN architecture to generate blurred faces. DartBlur can effectively hide facial privacy information while detection artifacts are simultaneously suppressed. We have designed four training objectives that particularly aim to improve review convenience and maximize detection artifact suppression. We associate the algorithm with an adversarial training strategy with a second-order optimization pipeline. Experimental results demonstrate that DartBlur outperforms the existing face-replacement method from both perspectives of review convenience and accessibility, and also shows an exclusive advantage in suppressing the training artifact compared to traditional blur-based methods. Our implementation is available at https://github.com/JaNg2333/DartBlur.

Poster
Can't Steal? Cont-Steal! Contrastive Stealing Attacks Against Image Encoders

Zeyang Sha, Xinlei He, Ning Yu, Michael Backes, Yang Zhang

展开摘要

Self-supervised representation learning techniques have been developing rapidly to make full use of unlabeled images. They encode images into rich features that are oblivious to downstream tasks. Behind their revolutionary representation power, the requirements for dedicated model designs and a massive amount of computation resources expose image encoders to the risks of potential model stealing attacks - a cheap way to mimic the well-trained encoder performance while circumventing the demanding requirements. Yet conventional attacks only target supervised classifiers given their predicted labels and/or posteriors, which leaves the vulnerability of unsupervised encoders unexplored. In this paper, we first instantiate the conventional stealing attacks against encoders and demonstrate their severer vulnerability compared with downstream classifiers. To better leverage the rich representation of encoders, we further propose Cont-Steal, a contrastive-learning-based attack, and validate its improved stealing effectiveness in various experiment settings. As a takeaway, we appeal to our community's attention to the intellectual property protection of representation learning techniques, especially to the defenses against encoder stealing attacks like ours.

Poster
CLIP2Protect: Protecting Facial Privacy Using Text-Guided Makeup via Adversarial Latent Search

Fahad Shamshad, Muzammal Naseer, Karthik Nandakumar

展开摘要

The success of deep learning based face recognition systems has given rise to serious privacy concerns due to their ability to enable unauthorized tracking of users in the digital world. Existing methods for enhancing privacy fail to generate naturalistic' images that can protect facial privacy without compromising user experience. We propose a novel two-step approach for facial privacy protection that relies on finding adversarial latent codes in the low-dimensional manifold of a pretrained generative model. The first step inverts the given face image into the latent space and finetunes the generative model to achieve an accurate reconstruction of the given image from its latent code. This step produces a good initialization, aiding the generation of high-quality faces that resemble the given identity. Subsequently, user defined makeup text prompts and identity-preserving regularization are used to guide the search for adversarial codes in the latent space. Extensive experiments demonstrate that faces generated by our approach have stronger black-box transferability with an absolute gain of 12.06% over the state-of-the-art facial privacy protection approach under the face verification task. Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach for commercial face recognition systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/fahadshamshad/Clip2Protect.

Poster