ICLR 2026 论文列表

We study the problem of graph and hypergraph sparsification in insertion-only data streams. The input is a hypergraph $H=(V, E, w)$ with $n$ nodes, $m$ hyperedges, and rank $r$, and the goal is to compute a hypergraph $\widehat{H}$ that preserves the energy of each vector $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ in $H$, up to a small multiplicative error. In this paper, we give a streaming algorithm that achieves a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximation, using $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{rn}{\varepsilon^2} \log^2 n \log r\right) \cdot$ poly $(\log \log m)$ bits of space, matching the sample complexity of the best known offline algorithm up to poly $(\log \log m)$ factors. Our approach also provides a streaming algorithm for graph sparsification that achieves a $(1+\varepsilon)$-approximation, using $\mathcal{O}\left(\frac{n}{\varepsilon^2} \log n\right)\cdot\text{poly}(\log\log n)$ bits of space, improving the current bound by $\log n$ factors. Furthermore, we give a space-efficient streaming algorithm for min-cut approximation. Along the way, we present an online algorithm for $(1+\varepsilon)$-hypergraph sparsification, which is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors. Hence, we achieve $(1+\varepsilon)$-hypergraph sparsification in the sliding window model, with space optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors. Lastly, we give an adversarially robust algorithm for hypergraph sparsification using $\frac{n}{\varepsilon^2} \cdot $ poly $(r, \log n, \log r, \log \log m)$ bits of space.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have demonstrated capabilities in multimodal understanding, yet their vulnerability to adversarial attacks raises significant concerns. To achieve practical attacking, this paper aims at efficient and transferable untargeted attacks under limited perturbation sizes. Considering this objective, white‑box attacks require full‑model gradients and task‑specific labels, making costs scale with tasks, while black‑box attacks rely on proxy models, typically requiring large perturbation sizes and elaborate transfer strategies. Given the centrality and widespread reuse of the vision encoder in LVLMs, we adopt a gray‑box setting that targets the vision encoder alone for efficient but effective attacking. We theoretically establish the feasibility of vision‑encoder‑only attacks, laying the foundation for our gray‑box setting. Based on this analysis, we propose perturbing patch tokens rather than the class token, informed by both theoretical and empirical insights. We generate adversarial examples by minimizing the cosine similarity between clean and perturbed visual features, without accessing the subsequent models, tasks, or labels. This significantly reduces computational overhead while eliminating the task and label dependence. VEAttack has achieved a performance degradation of 94.5% on image caption task and 75.7% on visual question answering task. We also reveal some key observations to provide insights into LVLM attack/defense: 1) hidden layer variations of LLM, 2) token attention differential, 3) Möbius band in transfer attack, 4) low sensitivity to attack steps.

Foundation Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel across benchmarks yet remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. While adversarial fine-tuning improves robustness, attaining a desirable clean–robust performance trade-off typically requires costly hyperparameter searches with multiple retraining runs. A promising alternative is to merge task vectors (i.e., parameter displacements from pre-trained models) to balance accuracy and robustness without retraining. However, we find that naive task-vector merging produces a near-linear trade-off, as it equally weights all coordinates and fails to distinguish weights that aid both objectives from those that create conflicts. To overcome this limitation, we propose a prediction stability-aware merging framework that composes task vectors from off-the-shelf naturally and robustly fine-tuned VLMs. Our key insight is that prediction stability serves as a proxy for cross-objective compatibility, enabling us to favor perturbation-invariant parameters while attenuating those with high cross-objective impact. Specifically, we estimate per-parameter stability from gradients under both objectives, building complementary masks that retain jointly stable coordinates while suppressing counterpart-sensitive ones. We further refine these masks along adversarial parameter trajectories, with steps weighted by a prediction-sensitivity index. Our theoretical analysis shows that the masks provably contract first-order cross-objective interference, and the prediction criticality index tracks curvature, biasing the merge toward flatter minima and better generalization. Extensive experiments across benchmarks and scenarios demonstrate our method consistently achieves superior clean–robust trade-offs over prior approaches, with the learned balance transferring effectively to downstream tasks.

The volume of freely scraped data on the Internet has driven the tremendous success of deep learning. Along with this comes the rising concern about data privacy and security. Numerous methods for generating unlearnable examples have been proposed to prevent data from being illicitly learned by unauthorized deep models by impeding generalization. However, the existing approaches primarily rely on empirical heuristics, making it challenging to enhance unlearnable examples with solid explanations. In this paper, we analyze and improve unlearnable examples from a novel perspective: mutual information reduction. We demonstrate that effective unlearnable examples always decrease mutual information between clean features and poisoned features, and when the network gets deeper, the unlearnability goes better together with lower mutual information. Further, we prove from a covariance reduction perspective that minimizing the conditional covariance of intra-class poisoned features reduces the mutual information between distributions. Based on the theoretical results, we propose a novel unlearnable method called Mutual Information Unlearnable Examples (MI-UE) that reduces covariance by maximizing the cosine similarity among intra-class features, thus impeding the generalization effectively. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods, even under defense mechanisms.

The Transformer model architecture has become one of the most widely used in deep learning and the attention mechanism is at its core. The standard attention formulation uses a softmax operation applied to a scaled dot product between query and key vectors. We explore the role played by norms of the queries and keys, which can cause training instabilities when they arbitrarily increase. We demonstrate how this can happen even in simple Transformer models, in the presence of easy-to-learn spurious patterns in the data. We propose a new attention formulation, QUEry-modulated Spherical aTtention (QUEST), that constrains the keys to a hyperspherical latent space, while still allowing individual tokens to flexibly control the sharpness of the attention distribution. QUEST can be easily used as a drop-in replacement for standard attention. We focus on vision applications while also exploring other domains to highlight the method's generality. We show that (1) QUEST trains without instabilities and (2) produces models with improved performance (3) that are robust to data corruptions and adversarial attacks.

This work tackles a critical challenge in AI safety research under limited compute: given a fixed computation budget, how can one maximize the strength of iterative adversarial attacks? Coarsely reducing the number of attack iterations lowers cost but substantially weakens effectiveness. To fulfill the attainable attack efficacy within a constrained budget, we propose a fine-grained control mechanism that selectively recomputes layer activations across both iteration-wise and layer-wise levels. Extensive experiments show that our method consistently outperforms existing baselines at equal cost. Moreover, when integrated into adversarial training, it attains comparable performance with only 30\% of the original budget.

The unlearning capability of LLMs is vital for ensuring compliance and safety, especially when removing sensitive knowledge from deployed models. Pre-filtering methods, enabling rapid deployment without parameter changes, are a prominent unlearning approach. However, they exhibit significant robustness deficiencies against adversarial attacks: in the worst case, simple prefix attacks can induce up to a 1,150-fold surge in information leakage for fictitious entity knowledge, while composite question attacks can cause accuracy on hazardous knowledge to rebound from the 24.9% random-guess baseline to as high as 67.0%. To address this, we propose a new unlearning framework via post judgment and multi-round thinking (PoRT), which consists of three key modules. First, a data cleaning module compiles a dynamic few-shot prompt that instructs the LLM to simultaneously generate both a cleaned version of the user's query and a corresponding initial response, supported by an extensible demonstration library for adaptive defense. Second, unlike existing pre-filtering methods that typically judge based solely on prompts, our post-judgment module jointly evaluates cleaned prompts and their corresponding responses to better detect non-compliant outputs. Finally, a selective multi-round thinking process is employed to trigger LLM's self-correction for low-confidence outputs, enhancing reliability and result quality. Extensive experiments on benchmarks demonstrate PoRT's superior robustness against adversarial attacks and strong unlearning effectiveness without compromising general model utility. Code is available at https://github.com/ChnIRuI/PoRT_LLM_Unlearning

Vision–Language Models (VLMs) have become essential for tasks such as image synthesis, captioning, and retrieval by aligning textual and visual information in a shared embedding space. Yet, this flexibility also makes them vulnerable to malicious prompts designed to produce unsafe content, raising critical safety concerns. Existing defenses either rely on blacklist filters, which are easily circumvented, or on heavy classifier-based systems, both of which are costly and fragile under embedding-level attacks. We address these challenges with two complementary components: Hyperbolic Prompt Espial (HyPE) and Hyperbolic Prompt Sanitization (HyPS). HyPE is a lightweight anomaly detector that leverages the structured geometry of hyperbolic space to model benign prompts and detect harmful ones as outliers. HyPS builds on this detection by applying explainable attribution methods to identify and selectively modify harmful words, neutralizing unsafe intent while preserving the original semantics of user prompts. Through extensive experiments across multiple datasets and adversarial scenarios, we prove that our framework consistently outperforms prior defenses in both detection accuracy and robustness. Together, HyPE and HyPS offer an efficient, interpretable, and resilient approach to safeguarding VLMs against malicious prompt misuse.

Neural network-based optimal transport (OT) is a recent and fruitful direction in the generative modeling community. It finds its applications in various fields such as domain translation, image super-resolution, computational biology and others. Among the existing OT approaches, of considerable interest are adversarial minimax solvers based on semi-dual formulations of OT problems. While promising, these methods lack theoretical investigation from a statistical learning perspective. Our work fills this gap by establishing upper bounds on the generalization error of an approximate OT map recovered by the minimax quadratic OT solver. Importantly, the bounds we derive depend solely on some standard statistical and mathematical properties of the considered functional classes (neural nets). While our analysis focuses on the quadratic OT, we believe that similar bounds could be derived for general OT case, paving the promising direction for future research. Our experimental illustrations are available online https://github.com/milenagazdieva/StatOT.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), such as GPT-4o and LLaVA, have recently witnessed remarkable advancements and are increasingly being deployed in real-world applications. However, inheriting the sensitivity of visual neural networks, LVLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which can result in erroneous or malicious outputs. While existing efforts utilize adversarial fine-tuning to enhance robustness, they often suffer from significant performance degradation on clean inputs. In this paper, we propose AdPO, a novel adversarial defense strategy for LVLMs based on preference optimization. For the first time, we reframe adversarial training as a preference optimization problem, aiming to enhance the model’s preference for generating normal outputs on clean inputs while rejecting the potential misleading outputs for adversarial examples. Notably, AdPO achieves this by solely modifying the image encoder, e.g., CLIP ViT, resulting in superior clean and adversarial performance in a variety of downstream tasks. Due to the computational cost of training large language models, we show that training on smaller LVLMs and transferring to larger ones achieves state-of-the-art performance with efficiency comparable to previous methods. Our comprehensive experiments confirm the effectiveness of the proposed AdPO which highlights the potential of preference-based learning in adversarially robust multimodal systems.

Even a slight perturbation in the graph structure can cause a significant drop in the accuracy of graph neural networks (GNNs). Most existing attacks leverage gradient information to perturb edges. This relaxes the attack's optimization problem from a discrete to a continuous space, resulting in solutions far from optimal. It also prevents the adaptability of the attack to non-differentiable objectives. Instead, we introduce a few simple, yet effective, enhancements of an evolutionary-based algorithm to solve the discrete optimization problem directly. Our Evolutionary Attack EvA works with any black-box model and objective, eliminating the need for a differentiable proxy loss. This allows us to design two novel attacks that reduce the effectiveness of robustness certificates and break conformal sets. EvA uses sparse representations to significantly reduce memory requirements and scale to larger graphs. We also introduce a divide and conquer strategy that improves both EvA and existing gradient-based attacks. Among our experiments, EvA shows $\sim$11\% additional drop in accuracy on average compared to the best previous attack, revealing significant untapped potential in designing attacks.

This paper investigates the problem of bandit learning in two-sided decentralized matching markets with adversarial corruptions. In matching markets, players on one side aim to learn their unknown preferences over arms on the other side through iterative online learning, with the goal of identifying the optimal stable match. However, in real-world applications, stochastic rewards observed by players may be corrupted by malicious adversaries, potentially misleading the learning process and causing convergence to a sub-optimal match. We study this problem under two settings: one where the corruption level $C$ (defined as the sum of the largest adversarial alterations to the feedback across rounds) is known, and another where it is unknown. For the known corruption setting, we develop a robust variant of the classical Explore-Then-Gale-Shapley (ETGS) algorithm by incorporating widened confidence intervals. For the unknown corruption case, we propose a Multi-layer ETGS race method that adaptively mitigates adversarial effects without prior corruption knowledge. We provide theoretical guarantees for both algorithms by establishing upper bounds on their optimal stable regret, and further derive the lower bound to demonstrate their optimality.

Training with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) at moderately large learning rates has been observed to improve robustness against spurious correlations, strong correlation between non-predictive features and target labels. Yet, the mechanism underlying this effect remains unclear. In this work, we identify batch size as an additional critical factor and show that robustness gains arise from the implicit regularization of SGD, which intensifies with larger learning rates and smaller batch sizes. This implicit regularization reduces reliance on spurious or shortcut features, thereby enhancing robustness while preserving accuracy. Importantly, this effect appears unique to SGD: gradient descent (GD) does not confer the same benefit and may even exacerbate shortcut reliance. Theoretically, we establish this phenomenon in linear models by leveraging statistical formulations of spurious correlations, proving that SGD systematically suppresses spurious feature dependence. Empirically, we demonstrate that the effect extends to deep neural networks across multiple benchmarks. For the experiments and codes, please refer to this \href{https://github.com/ICLR2026-submission/implicit-regularization-in-group-robustness}{GitHub repository}.

While Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) and Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful approaches for learning on Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs), a comprehensive understanding of their robustness remains elusive. Current evaluations are fragmented, failing to systematically investigate the distinct effects of textual and structural perturbations across diverse models and attack scenarios. To address these limitations, we introduce a unified and comprehensive framework to evaluate robustness in TAG learning. Our framework evaluates classical GNNs, robust GNNs (RGNNs), and GraphLLMs across ten datasets from four domains, under diverse text-based, structure-based, and hybrid perturbations in both poisoning and evasion scenarios. Our extensive analysis reveals multiple findings, among which three are particularly noteworthy: 1) models have inherent robustness trade-offs between text and structure, 2) the performance of GNNs and RGNNs depends heavily on the text encoder and attack type, and 3) GraphLLMs are particularly vulnerable to training data corruption. To overcome the identified trade-offs, we introduce SFT-auto, a novel framework that delivers superior and balanced robustness against both textual and structural attacks within a single model. Our work establishes a foundation for future research on TAG security and offers practical solutions for robust TAG learning in adversarial environments. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Leirunlin/TGRB.

In this paper, we show that the prevailing view that information dependency (including rote memorization) drives training data exposure to image reconstruction attacks is incomplete. We find that extensive exposure can persist without rote memorization, driven instead by a tunable connection to adversarial robustness. We begin by presenting three surprising results: (1) recent defenses that inhibit reconstruction by Model Inversion Attacks (MIAs), which evaluate leakage under an idealized attacker, do *not* reduce standard measures of information dependency (HSIC); (2) models that maximally memorize their training datasets remain robust to MIA reconstruction; and (3) models trained without seeing 97% of the training pixels, where recent information-theoretic bounds give arbitrarily strong privacy guarantees under standard assumptions, can still be devastatingly reconstructed by MIA. To explain these findings, we provide causal evidence that privacy under MIA arises from what the adversarial examples literature calls ``non-robust'' features (generalizable but imperceptible and unstable features). We further show that recent MIA defenses obtain their privacy improvements by unintentionally shifting models toward such features. We leverage this mechanism to introduce Anti-Adversarial Training (AT-AT), a training regime that intentionally learns non-robust features to obtain both superior reconstruction defense and higher accuracy than state-of-the-art defenses. Our results revise the prevailing understanding of training data exposure and reveal a new privacy-robustness tradeoff.

Deep neural networks remain highly vulnerable to adversarial examples, and most defenses collapse once gradients can be reliably estimated. We identify \emph{gradient consensus}—the tendency of randomized transformations to yield aligned gradients—as a key driver of adversarial transferability. Attackers exploit this consensus to construct perturbations that remain effective across transformations. We introduce \textbf{DRIFT} (Divergent Response in Filtered Transformations), a stochastic ensemble of lightweight, learnable filters trained to actively disrupt gradient consensus. Unlike prior randomized defenses that rely on gradient masking, DRIFT enforces \emph{gradient dissonance} by maximizing divergence in Jacobian- and logit-space responses while preserving natural predictions. Our contributions are threefold: (i) we formalize gradient consensus and provide a theoretical analysis linking consensus to transferability; (ii) we propose a consensus-divergence training strategy combining prediction consistency, Jacobian separation, logit-space separation, and adversarial robustness; and (iii) we show that DRIFT achieves substantial robustness gains on ImageNet across CNNs and Vision Transformers, outperforming state-of-the-art preprocessing, adversarial training, and diffusion-based defenses under adaptive white-box, transfer-based, and gradient-free attacks. DRIFT delivers these improvements with negligible runtime and memory cost, establishing gradient divergence as a practical and generalizable principle for adversarial defense.

The widespread use of publicly available pre-trained encoders from self-supervised learning (SSL) has exposed a critical vulnerability: their susceptibility to downstream-agnostic adversarial examples (DAEs), which are crafted without knowledge of the downstream tasks but capable of misleading downstream models. While several defense methods have been explored recently, they rely primarily on task-specific adversarial fine-tuning, which inevitably limits generalizability and causes catastrophic forgetting and deteriorates benign performance. Different with previous works, we propose a more rigorous defense goal that requires only a single tuning for diverse downstream tasks to defend against DAEs and preserve benign performance. To achieve this defense goal, we introduce **Ze**ro-Sacrifice **P**ersistent-Robustness **A**dversarial **D**efense (**ZePAD**), which is inspired by the inherent sensitivity of neural networks to data characteristics. Specifically, ZePAD is a dual-branch structure, which consists of a Multi-Pattern Adversarial Enhancement Branch (MPAE-Branch) that uses two adversarially fine-tuned encoders to strengthen adversarial resistance. The Benign Memory Preservation Branch (BMP-Branch) is trained on local data to ensure adversarial robustness does not compromise benign performance. Surprisingly, we find that ZePAD can directly detect DAEs by evaluating branch confidence, without introducing any adversarial exsample identification task during training. Notably, by enriching feature diversity, our method enables a single adversarial fine-tuning to defend against DAEs across downstream tasks, thereby achieving persistent robustness. Extensive experiments on 11 SSL methods and 6 datasets validate its effectiveness. In certain cases, it achieves a 29.20\% improvement in benign performance and a 73.86\% gain in adversarial robustness, highlighting its zero-sacrifice property.

This study investigates behavior-targeted attacks on reinforcement learning and their countermeasures. Behavior-targeted attacks aim to manipulate the victim's behavior as desired by the adversary through adversarial interventions in state observations. Existing behavior-targeted attacks have some limitations, such as requiring white-box access to the victim's policy. To address this, we propose a novel attack method using imitation learning from adversarial demonstrations, which works under limited access to the victim's policy and is environment-agnostic. In addition, our theoretical analysis proves that the policy's sensitivity to state changes impacts defense performance, particularly in the early stages of the trajectory. Based on this insight, we propose time-discounted regularization, which enhances robustness against attacks while maintaining task performance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first defense strategy specifically designed for behavior-targeted attacks.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) has demonstrated strong performance in video understanding tasks, yet its adversarial robustness remains underexplored. Existing attack methods often treat MoE as a unified architecture, overlooking the independent and collaborative weaknesses of key components such as routers and expert modules. To fill this gap, we propose Temporal Lipschitz-Guided Attacks (TLGA) to thoroughly investigate component-level vulnerabilities in video MoE models. We first design attacks on the router, revealing its independent weaknesses. Building on this, we introduce Joint Temporal Lipschitz-Guided Attacks (J-TLGA), which collaboratively perturb both routers and experts. This joint attack significantly amplifies adversarial effects and exposes the Achilles’ Heel (collaborative weaknesses) of the MoE architecture. Based on these insights, we further propose Joint Temporal Lipschitz Adversarial Training (J-TLAT). J-TLAT performs joint training to further defend against collaborative weaknesses, enhancing component-wise robustness. Our framework is plug-and-play and reduces inference cost by more than 60% compared with dense models. It consistently enhances adversarial robustness across diverse video datasets and model architectures, effectively mitigating both the independent and collaborative weaknesses of MoE.