NeurIPS 2025 Papers

This work analyzes singular-value spectra of weight matrices in pretrained transformer models to understand how information is stored at both ends of the spectrum. Using Random Matrix Theory (RMT) as a zero information hypothesis, we associate agreement with RMT as evidence of randomness and deviations as evidence for learning. Surprisingly, we observe pronounced departures from RMT not only among the largest singular values - the usual outliers - but also among the smallest ones. A comparison of the associated singular vectors with the eigenvectors of the activation covariance matrices shows that there is considerable overlap wherever RMT is violated. Thus, significant directions in the data are captured by small singular values and their vectors as well as by the large ones. We confirm this empirically: zeroing out the singular values that deviate from RMT raises language-model perplexity far more than removing values from the bulk, and after fine-tuning the smallest decile can be the third most influential part of the spectrum. To explain how vectors linked to small singular values can carry more information than those linked to larger values, we propose a linear random-matrix model. Our findings highlight the overlooked importance of the low end of the spectrum and provide theoretical and practical guidance for SVD-based pruning and compression of large language models.

The augmentation of algorithms with predictions of the optimal solution, such as from a machine-learning algorithm, has garnered significant attention in recent years, particularly in facility location problems. Moving beyond the traditional focus on utilitarian and egalitarian objectives, we design learning-augmented facility location mechanisms for the envy ratio objective, a fairness metric defined as the maximum ratio between the utilities of any two agents. For the deterministic setting, we propose a mechanism which utilizes predictions to achieve $\alpha$-consistency and $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha - 1}$-robustness for a selected parameter $\alpha \in [1,2]$, and prove its optimality. We also resolve open questions raised by Ding et al. [2020], devising a randomized mechanism without predictions to improve upon the best-known approximation ratio from $2$ to $1.8944$. Building upon these advancements, we construct a novel randomized mechanism which incorporates predictions to achieve improved performance guarantees.

Despite the promising results of disentangled representation learning in discovering latent patterns in graph-structured data, few studies have explored disentanglement for hypergraph-structured data. Integrating hyperedge disentanglement into hypergraph neural networks enables models to leverage hidden hyperedge semantics, such as unannotated relations between nodes, that are associated with labels. This paper presents an analysis of hyperedge disentanglement from a category-theoretical perspective and proposes a novel criterion for disentanglement derived from the naturality condition. Our proof-of-concept model experimentally showed the potential of the proposed criterion by successfully capturing functional relations of genes (nodes) in genetic pathways (hyperedges).

The quadratic complexity of self‑attention prevents transformers from scaling effectively to long input sequences. On the other hand, modern GPUs and other specialized hardware accelerators are well-optimized for processing small input sequences in transformers during both training and inference. A natural question arises: can we take advantage of the efficiency of small transformers to deal with long input sequences? In this paper, we show that transformers with long input sequences (large transformers) can be efficiently simulated by transformers that can only take short input sequences (small transformers). Specifically, we prove that any transformer with input length $N$ can be efficiently simulated by only $O((N/M)^2)$ transformers with input length $M \ll N$, and that this cannot be improved in the worst case. However, we then prove that in various natural scenarios including average-case inputs, sliding window masking and attention sinks, the optimal number $O(N/M)$ of small transformers suffice.

What does it truly mean for a language model to “reason” strategically, and can scaling up alone guarantee intelligent, context-aware decisions? Strategic decision-making requires adaptive reasoning, where agents anticipate and respond to others’ actions under uncertainty. Yet, most evaluations of large language models (LLMs) for strategic decision-making often rely heavily on Nash Equilibrium (NE) benchmarks, overlook reasoning depth, and fail to reveal the mechanisms behind model behavior. To address this gap, we introduce a behavioral game-theoretic evaluation framework that disentangles intrinsic reasoning from contextual influence. Using this framework, we evaluate 22 state-of-the-art LLMs across diverse strategic scenarios. We find models like GPT-o3-mini, GPT-o1, and DeepSeek-R1 lead in reasoning depth. Through thinking chain analysis, we identify distinct reasoning styles—such as maximin or belief-based strategies—and show that longer reasoning chains do not consistently yield better decisions. Furthermore, embedding demographic personas reveals context-sensitive shifts: some models (e.g., GPT-4o, Claude-3-Opus) improve when assigned female identities, while others (e.g., Gemini 2.0) show diminished reasoning under minority sexuality personas. These findings underscore that technical sophistication alone is insufficient; alignment with ethical standards, human expectations, and situational nuance is essential for the responsible deployment of LLMs in interactive settings.

Curriculum learning has emerged as an effective strategy to enhance the training efficiency and generalization of machine learning models. However, its theoretical underpinnings remain relatively underexplored. In this work, we develop a theoretical framework for curriculum learning based on biased regularized empirical risk minimization (RERM), identifying conditions under which curriculum learning provably improves generalization. We introduce a sufficient condition that characterizes a "good" curriculum and analyze a multi-task curriculum framework, where solving a sequence of convex tasks can facilitate better generalization. We also demonstrate how these theoretical insights translate to practical benefits when using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) as an optimization method. Beyond convex settings, we explore the utility of curriculum learning for non-convex tasks. Empirical evaluations on synthetic datasets and MNIST validate our theoretical findings and highlight the practical efficacy of curriculum-based training.

Equivariant neural networks provide a principled framework for incorporating symmetry into learning architectures and have been extensively analyzed through the lens of their *separation power*, that is, the ability to distinguish inputs modulo symmetry. This notion plays a central role in settings such as graph learning, where it is often formalized via the Weisfeilern–Leman hierarchy. In contrast, the *universality* of equivariant models—their capacity to approximate target functions—remains comparatively underexplored. In this work, we investigate the approximation power of equivariant neural networks beyond separation constraints. We show that separation power does not fully capture expressivity: models with identical separation power may differ in their approximation ability. To demonstrate this, we characterize the universality classes of shallow invariant networks, providing a general framework for understanding which functions these architectures can approximate. Since equivariant models reduce to invariant ones under projection, this analysis yields sufficient conditions under which shallow equivariant networks fail to be universal. Conversely, we identify settings where shallow models do achieve separation-constrained universality. These positive results, however, depend critically on structural properties of the symmetry group, such as the existence of adequate normal subgroups, which may not hold in important cases like permutation symmetry.

We propose and analyze a new class of unbalanced weak optimal transport (OT) problems with total variation penalties, motivated by spatial resource allocation tasks. Unlike classical OT, our framework accommodates general unbalanced nonnegative measures and incorporates cost objectives that directly capture operational trade-offs between transport cost and supply–demand mismatch. In the general setting, we establish the existence of optimal solutions and a dual formulation. We then focus on the semi-discrete setting, where one measure is discrete and the other is absolutely continuous, a structure relevant to applications such as service area partitioning for facilities like schools or medical stations. Exploiting a tessellation-based structure, we derive the corresponding explicit optimality conditions. We further address a quantization problem that jointly optimizes the locations and weights of discrete support points, applicable to facility location tasks such as the cost-efficient deployment of battery swap stations or e-commerce warehouses, informed by demand-side data. The dual-tessellation structure also yields explicit gradient expressions, enabling efficient numerical optimization in finite dimensions.

Correlated equilibria —and their generalization $\Phi$-equilibria— are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in multi-player settings. While computational aspects of equilibrium computation are well-understood in some settings, fundamental questions are still open in _generalized games_, that is, games in which the set of strategies allowed to each player depends on the other players' strategies. These classes of games model fundamental settings in economics and have been a cornerstone of economics research since the seminal paper of Arrow and Debreu [1954]. Recently, there has been growing interest, both in economics and in computer science, in studying correlated equilibria in generalized games. It is known that finding a social welfare maximizing correlated equilibrium in generalized games is NP-hard. However, the existence of efficient algorithms to find _any_ equilibrium remains an important open question. In this paper, we answer this question negatively, showing that this problem is PPAD-complete.

We study the problem of no-regret learning algorithms for general monotone and smooth games and their last-iterate convergence properties. Specifically, we investigate the problem under bandit feedback and strongly uncoupled dynamics, which allows modular development of the multi-player system that applies to a wide range of real applications. We propose a mirror-descent-based algorithm, which converges in $O(T^{-1/4})$ and is also no-regret. The result is achieved by a dedicated use of two regularizations and the analysis of the fixed point thereof. The convergence rate is further improved to $O(T^{-1/2})$ in the case of strongly monotone games. Motivated by practical tasks where the game evolves over time, the algorithm is extended to time-varying monotone games. We provide the first non-asymptotic result in converging monotone games and give improved results for equilibrium tracking games.

We formalize and analyze the trade-off between backdoor-based watermarks and adversarial defenses, framing it as an interactive protocol between a verifier and a prover. While previous works have primarily focused on this trade-off, our analysis extends it by identifying transferable attacks as a third, counterintuitive but necessary option. Our main result shows that for all learning tasks, at least one of the three exists: a _watermark_, an _adversarial defense_, or a _transferable attack_. By transferable attack, we refer to an efficient algorithm that generates queries indistinguishable from the data distribution and capable of fooling _all_ efficient defenders. Using cryptographic techniques, specifically fully homomorphic encryption, we construct a transferable attack and prove its necessity in this trade-off. Finally, we show that tasks of bounded VC-dimension allow adversarial defenses against all attackers, while a subclass allows watermarks secure against fast adversaries.

An established measure of the expressive power of a given ReLU neural network is the number of linear regions into which it partitions the input space. There exist many different, non-equivalent definitions of what a linear region actually is. We systematically assess which papers use which definitions and discuss how they relate to each other. We then analyze the computational complexity of counting the number of such regions for the various definitions. Generally, this turns out to be an intractable problem. We prove NP- and \#P-hardness results already for networks with one hidden layer and strong hardness of approximation results for two or more hidden layers. Finally, on the algorithmic side, we demonstrate that counting linear regions can at least be achieved in polynomial space for some common definitions.

We present two sharp, closed-form empirical Bernstein inequalities for symmetric random matrices with bounded eigenvalues. By sharp, we mean that both inequalities adapt to the unknown variance in a tight manner: the deviation captured by the first-order $1/\sqrt{n}$ term asymptotically matches the matrix Bernstein inequality exactly, including constants, the latter requiring knowledge of the variance. Our first inequality holds for the sample mean of independent matrices, and our second inequality holds for a mean estimator under martingale dependence at stopping times.

With businesses starting to deploy agents to act on their behalf, an emerging challenge that businesses have to contend with is how to incentivize other agents with differing interests to work alongside its own agent. In present day commerce, payment is a common way that different parties use to \emph{economically} align their interests. In this paper, we study how one could analogously learn such payment schemes for aligning agents in the decentralized multi-agent setting. We model this problem as a Stackelberg Markov game, in which the leader can commit to a policy and also designate a set of outcome-based payments. We are interested in answering the question: when do efficient learning algorithms exist? To this end, we characterize the computational and statistical complexity of planning and learning in general-sum and cooperative games. In general-sum games, we find that planning is computationally intractable. In cooperative games, we show that learning can be statistically hard without payment and efficient with payment, showing that payment is necessary for learning even with aligned rewards. Altogether, our work aims to consolidate our theoretical understanding of outcome-based payment algorithms that can economically align decentralized agents.

Although Shapley additive explanations (SHAP) can be computed in polynomial time for simple models like decision trees, they unfortunately become NP-hard to compute for more expressive black-box models like neural networks - where generating explanations is often most critical. In this work, we analyze the problem of computing SHAP explanations for *Tensor Networks (TNs)*, a broader and more expressive class of models than those for which current exact SHAP algorithms are known to hold, and which is widely used for neural network abstraction and compression. First, we introduce a general framework for computing provably exact SHAP explanations for general TNs with arbitrary structures. Interestingly, we show that, when TNs are restricted to a *Tensor Train (TT)* structure, SHAP computation can be performed in *poly-logarithmic* time using *parallel* computation. Thanks to the expressiveness power of TTs, this complexity result can be generalized to many other popular ML models such as decision trees, tree ensembles, linear models, and linear RNNs, therefore tightening previously reported complexity results for these families of models. Finally, by leveraging reductions of binarized neural networks to Tensor Network representations, we demonstrate that SHAP computation can become *efficiently tractable* when the network’s *width* is fixed, while it remains computationally hard even with constant *depth*. This highlights an important insight: for this class of models, width - rather than depth - emerges as the primary computational bottleneck in SHAP computation.

We examine the problem of efficiently learning coarse correlated equilibria (CCE) in polyhedral games, that is, normal-form games with an exponentially large number of actions per player and an underlying combinatorial structure—such as the classic Colonel Blotto game or congestion games. Achieving computational efficiency in this setting requires learning algorithms whose regret and per-iteration complexity scale at most polylogarithmically with the size of the players’ action sets. This challenge has recently been addressed in the full-information setting, primarily through the use of kernelization; however, in the more realistic partial information setting, the situation is much more challenging, and existing approaches result in suboptimal and impractical runtime complexity to learn CCE. We address this gap via a novel kernelization-based framework for payoff-based learning in polyhedral games, which we then apply to certain key classes of polyhedral games—namely Colonel Blotto, graphic matroid and network congestion games. In so doing, we obtain a range of computationally efficient payoff-based learning algorithms which significantly improve upon prior work in terms of the runtime for learning CCE.

Machine unlearning algorithms aim to remove the influence of specific training samples, ideally recovering the model that would have resulted from training on the remaining data alone. We study unlearning in the overparameterized setting, where many models interpolate the data, and defining the solution as any loss minimizer over the retained set—as in prior work in the underparameterized setting—is inadequate, since the original model may already interpolate the retained data and satisfy this condition. In this regime, loss gradients vanish, rendering prior methods based on gradient perturbations ineffective, motivating both new unlearning definitions and algorithms. For this setting, we define the unlearning solution as the minimum-complexity interpolator over the retained data and propose a new algorithmic framework that only requires access to model gradients on the retained set at the original solution. We minimize a regularized objective over perturbations constrained to be orthogonal to these model gradients, a first-order relaxation of the interpolation condition. For different model classes, we provide exact and approximate unlearning guarantees and demonstrate that an implementation of our framework outperforms existing baselines across various unlearning experiments.

Cooperative bargaining games are widely used to model resource allocation and conflict resolution. Traditional solutions assume the mediator can access agents’ utility function values and gradients. However, there is an increasing number of settings, such as human-AI interactions, where utility values may be inaccessible or incomparable due to unknown, nonaffine transformations. To model such settings, we consider that the mediator has access only to agents' $\textit{most preferred directions}-$normalized utility gradients in the decision space. To this end, we propose a cooperative bargaining algorithm where a mediator has access to only the direction oracle of each agent. We prove that unlike popular approaches such as the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, our approach is invariant to monotonic nonaffine transformations, and that under strong convexity and smoothness assumptions, this approach enjoys global asymptotic convergence to Pareto stationary solutions. Moreover, we show that the bargaining solutions found by our algorithm also satisfy the axioms of symmetry and (under slightly stronger conditions) independence of irrelevant alternatives, which are popular in the literature. Finally, we conduct experiments in two domains, multi-agent formation assignment and mediated stock portfolio allocation, which validate these theoretical results.

In this paper, we examine the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning under uncertainty. Specifically, we analyze two stochastic models of regularized learning in continuous games—one in continuous and one in discrete time—with the aim of characterizing the long run behavior of the induced sequence of play. In stark contrast to deterministic, full-information models of learning (or models with a vanishing learning rate), we show that the resulting dynamics do not converge in general. In lieu of this, we ask instead which actions are played more often in the long run, and by how much. We show that, in strongly monotone games, the dynamics of regularized learning may wander away from equilibrium infinitely often, but they always return to its vicinity in finite time (which we estimate), and their long-run distribution is sharply concentrated around a neighborhood thereof. We quantify the degree of this concentration, and we show that these favorable properties may all break down if the underlying game is not strongly monotone—underscoring in this way the limits of regularized learning in the presence of persistent randomness and uncertainty