ICLR 2026 Papers

International Conference on Learning Representations

Decision breakdown

5,358papers

Counted from the official paper list; may differ slightly from the number the conference announced.

  • Oral
    2244.2%
  • Poster
    5,13495.8%

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Every Language Model Has a Forgery-Resistant Signature

Matthew Finlayson, Xiang Ren, Swabha Swayamdipta

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The ubiquity of closed-weight language models with public-facing APIs has generated interest in forensic methods, both for extracting hidden model details (e.g., parameters) and identifying models by their outputs. One successful approach to these goals has been to exploit the geometric constraints imposed by the language model architecture and parameters. In this work, we show that a lesser-known geometric constraint—namely that language model outputs lie on the surface of a high-dimensional ellipse—functions as a signature for the model, which be used to identify which model an output came from. This ellipse signature has unique properties that distinguish it from existing model-output association methods like language model watermarks. In particular, the signature is hard to forge: without direct access to model parameters, it is practically infeasible to produce logprobs on the ellipse. Secondly, the signature is naturally occurring, since all language models have these elliptical constraints. Thirdly, the signature is self-contained, in that it is detectable without access to the model input or full weights. Finally, the signature is exceptionally redundant, as it is independently detectable in every single logprob output from the model. We evaluate a novel technique for extracting the ellipse on small models, and discuss the practical hurdles that make it infeasible for production-size models, making the signature hard to forge. Finally, we use ellipse signatures to propose a protocol for language model output verification, which is analogous to cryptographic symmetric-key message authentication systems.

Oral
Intrinsic Explanation of Random Subspace Method for Enhanced Security Applications

Yanting Wang, Jinyuan Jia

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Random subspace method has wide security applications such as providing certified defenses against adversarial and backdoor attacks, and building robustly aligned LLM against jailbreaking attacks. However, the explanation of random subspace methods lacks sufficient exploration. Existing state-of-the-art feature attribution methods, such as Shapley value and LIME are computationally impractical and lack robustness guarantees when applied to random subspace methods. In this work, we propose EnsembleSHAP, an intrinsically faithful and robust feature attribution for random subspace methods that reuses its computational byproducts. Specifically, our feature attribution method is 1) computationally efficient, 2) maintains essential properties of effective feature attribution (such as local accuracy), and 3) offers guaranteed robustness against attacks on feature attribution methods. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to establish provable robustness against explanation-preserving attacks. We also perform comprehensive evaluations for our explanation’s effectiveness when faced with different empirical attacks, including backdoor attacks, adversarial attacks, and jailbreak attacks.

Poster