ICLR 2024 Papers

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the *de-randomized smoothing* technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a *window ablation* scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against $9$ empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected $15.5K$ recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time. Our code and dataset are available at - https://github.com/ShoumikSaha/DRSM

Vertical federated learning (VFL), where each participating client holds a subset of data features, has found numerous applications in finance, healthcare, and IoT systems. However, adversarial attacks, particularly through the injection of adversarial examples (AEs), pose serious challenges to the security of VFL models. In this paper, we investigate such vulnerabilities through developing a novel attack to disrupt the VFL inference process, under a practical scenario where the adversary is able to *adaptively corrupt a subset of clients*. We formulate the problem of finding optimal attack strategies as an online optimization problem, which is decomposed into an inner problem of adversarial example generation (AEG) and an outer problem of corruption pattern selection (CPS). Specifically, we establish the equivalence between the formulated CPS problem and a multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, and propose the Thompson sampling with Empirical maximum reward (E-TS) algorithm for the adversary to efficiently identify the optimal subset of clients for corruption. The key idea of E-TS is to introduce an estimation of the expected maximum reward for each arm, which helps to specify a small set of *competitive arms*, on which the exploration for the optimal arm is performed. This significantly reduces the exploration space, which otherwise can quickly become prohibitively large as the number of clients increases. We analytically characterize the regret bound of E-TS, and empirically demonstrate its capability of efficiently revealing the optimal corruption pattern with the highest attack success rate, under various datasets of popular VFL tasks.

Mixup is a data augmentation strategy that employs convex combinations of training instances and their respective labels to improve the robustness and calibration of deep neural networks. Despite its widespread adoption, the nuanced mechanisms that underpin its success are not entirely understood. The observed phenomenon of Neural Collapse, where the last-layer activations and classifier of deep networks converge to a simplex equiangular tight frame (ETF), provides a compelling motivation to explore whether mixup induces alternative geometric configurations and whether those could explain its success. In this study, we delve into the last-layer activations of training data for deep networks subjected to mixup, aiming to uncover insights into its operational efficacy. Our investigation, spanning various architectures and dataset pairs, reveals that mixup's last-layer activations predominantly converge to a distinctive configuration different than one might expect. In this configuration, activations from mixed-up examples of identical classes align with the classifier, while those from different classes delineate channels along the decision boundary. These findings are unexpected, as mixed-up features are not simple convex combinations of feature class means (as one might get, for example, by training mixup with the mean squared error loss). By analyzing this distinctive geometric configuration, we elucidate the mechanisms by which mixup enhances model calibration. To further validate our empirical observations, we conduct a theoretical analysis under the assumption of an unconstrained features model, utilizing the mixup loss. Through this, we characterize and derive the optimal last-layer features under the assumption that the classifier forms a simplex ETF.

Optimal Transport (OT) problem aims to find a transport plan that bridges two distributions while minimizing a given cost function. OT theory has been widely utilized in generative modeling. In the beginning, OT distance has been used as a measure for assessing the distance between data and generated distributions. Recently, OT transport map between data and prior distributions has been utilized as a generative model. These OT-based generative models share a similar adversarial training objective. In this paper, we begin by unifying these OT-based adversarial methods within a single framework. Then, we elucidate the role of each component in training dynamics through a comprehensive analysis of this unified framework. Moreover, we suggest a simple but novel method that improves the previously best-performing OT-based model. Intuitively, our approach conducts a gradual refinement of the generated distribution, progressively aligning it with the data distribution. Our approach achieves a FID score of 2.51 on CIFAR-10 and 5.99 on CelebA-HQ-256, outperforming unified OT-based adversarial approaches.

We introduce a novel approach to counter adversarial attacks, namely, image resampling. Image resampling transforms a discrete image into a new one, simulating the process of scene recapturing or rerendering as specified by a geometrical transformation. The underlying rationale behind our idea is that image resampling can alleviate the influence of adversarial perturbations while preserving essential semantic information, thereby conferring an inherent advantage in defending against adversarial attacks. To validate this concept, we present a comprehensive study on leveraging image resampling to defend against adversarial attacks. We have developed basic resampling methods that employ interpolation strategies and coordinate shifting magnitudes. Our analysis reveals that these basic methods can partially mitigate adversarial attacks. However, they come with apparent limitations: the accuracy of clean images noticeably decreases, while the improvement in accuracy on adversarial examples is not substantial.We propose implicit representation-driven image resampling (IRAD) to overcome these limitations. First, we construct an implicit continuous representation that enables us to represent any input image within a continuous coordinate space. Second, we introduce SampleNet, which automatically generates pixel-wise shifts for resampling in response to different inputs. Furthermore, we can extend our approach to the state-of-the-art diffusion-based method, accelerating it with fewer time steps while preserving its defense capability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the adversarial robustness of diverse deep models against various attacks while maintaining high accuracy on clean images.

As robustness verification methods are becoming more precise, training certifiably robust neural networks is becoming ever more relevant. To this end, certified training methods compute and then optimize an upper bound on the worst-case loss over a robustness specification. Curiously, training methods based on the imprecise interval bound propagation (IBP) consistently outperform those leveraging more precise bounds. Still, we lack a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms making IBP so successful. In this work, we investigate these mechanisms by leveraging a novel metric measuring the tightness of IBP bounds. We first show theoretically that, for deep linear models (DLNs), tightness decreases with width and depth at initialization, but improves with IBP training. We, then, derive sufficient and necessary conditions on weight matrices for IBP bounds to become exact and demonstrate that these impose strong regularization, providing an explanation for the observed robustness-accuracy trade-off. Finally, we show how these results on DLNs transfer to ReLU networks, before conducting an extensive empirical study, (i) confirming this transferability and yielding state-of-the-art certified accuracy, (ii) finding that while all IBP-based training methods lead to high tightness, this increase is dominated by the size of the propagated input regions rather than the robustness specification, and finally (iii) observing that non-IBP-based methods do not increase tightness. Together, these results help explain the success of recent certified training methods and may guide the development of new ones.

Instruction fine-tuning has recently emerged as a promising approach for improving the zero-shot capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) on new tasks. This technique has shown particular strength in improving the performance of modestly sized LLMs, sometimes inducing performance competitive with much larger model variants. In this paper, we ask two questions: (1) How sensitive are instruction-tuned models to the particular phrasings of instructions, and, (2) How can we make them more robust to such natural language variation? To answer the former, we collect a set of 319 instructions manually written by NLP practitioners for over 80 unique tasks included in widely used benchmarks, and we evaluate the variance and average performance of these instructions as compared to instruction phrasings observed during instruction fine-tuning. We find that using novel (unobserved) but appropriate instruction phrasings consistently degrades model performance, sometimes substantially so. Further, such natural instructions yield a wide variance in downstream performance, despite their semantic equivalence. Put another way, instruction-tuned models are not especially robust to instruction re-phrasings. We propose a simple method to mitigate this issue by introducing ``soft prompt'' embedding parameters and optimizing these to maximize the similarity between representations of semantically equivalent instructions. We show that this method consistently improves the robustness of instruction-tuned models.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being used in real-world applications, they remain vulnerable to *prompt injection attacks*: malicious third party prompts that subvert the intent of the system designer. To help researchers study this problem, we present a dataset of over 563,000 prompt injection attacks and 118,000 prompt-based "defenses" against prompt injection, all created by players of an online game called Tensor Trust. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first dataset that includes both human-generated attacks and defenses for instruction-following LLMs. The attacks in our dataset have easily interpretable structure, and shed light on the weaknesses of LLMs. We also use the dataset to create a benchmark for resistance to two types of prompt injection, which we refer to as *prompt extraction* and *prompt hijacking*. Our benchmark results show that many models are vulnerable to the attack strategies in the Tensor Trust dataset. Furthermore, we show that some attack strategies from the dataset generalize to deployed LLM-based applications, even though they have a very different set of constraints to the game. We release data and code at [tensortrust.ai/paper](https://tensortrust.ai/paper)

Generative adversarial networks (GANs) learn a target probability distribution by optimizing a generator and a discriminator with minimax objectives. This paper addresses the question of whether such optimization actually provides the generator with gradients that make its distribution close to the target distribution. We derive *metrizable conditions*, sufficient conditions for the discriminator to serve as the distance between the distributions, by connecting the GAN formulation with the concept of sliced optimal transport. Furthermore, by leveraging these theoretical results, we propose a novel GAN training scheme called the Slicing Adversarial Network (SAN). With only simple modifications, a broad class of existing GANs can be converted to SANs. Experiments on synthetic and image datasets support our theoretical results and the effectiveness of SAN as compared to the usual GANs. We also apply SAN to StyleGAN-XL, which leads to a state-of-the-art FID score amongst GANs for class conditional generation on CIFAR10 and ImageNet 256$\times$256. The code is available at https://github.com/sony/san.

In standard adversarial training, models are optimized to fit invariant one-hot labels for adversarial data when the perturbations are within allowable budgets. However, the overconfident target harms generalization and causes the problem of robust overfitting. To address this issue and enhance adversarial robustness, we analyze the characteristics of robust models and identify that robust models tend to produce smoother and well-calibrated outputs. Based on the observation, we propose a simple yet effective method, Annealing Self-Distillation Rectification (ADR), which generates soft labels as a better guidance mechanism that reflects the underlying distribution of data. By utilizing ADR, we can obtain rectified labels that improve model robustness without the need for pre-trained models or extensive extra computation. Moreover, our method facilitates seamless plug-and-play integration with other adversarial training techniques by replacing the hard labels in their objectives. We demonstrate the efficacy of ADR through extensive experiments and strong performances across datasets.

In light of recent advancements in generative AI models, it has become essential to distinguish genuine content from AI-generated one to prevent the malicious usage of fake materials as authentic ones and vice versa. Various techniques have been introduced for identifying AI-generated images, with watermarking emerging as a promising approach. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of various AI-image detectors including watermarking and classifier-based deepfake detectors. For watermarking methods that introduce subtle image perturbations (i.e., low perturbation budget methods), we reveal a fundamental trade-off between the evasion error rate (i.e., the fraction of watermarked images detected as non-watermarked ones) and the spoofing error rate (i.e., the fraction of non-watermarked images detected as watermarked ones) upon an application of a diffusion purification attack. In this regime, we also empirically show that diffusion purification effectively removes watermarks with minimal changes to images. For high perturbation watermarking methods where notable changes are applied to images, the diffusion purification attack is not effective. In this case, we develop a model substitution adversarial attack that can successfully remove watermarks. Moreover, we show that watermarking methods are vulnerable to spoofing attacks where the attacker aims to have real images (potentially obscene) identified as watermarked ones, damaging the reputation of the developers. In particular, by just having black-box access to the watermarking method, we show that one can generate a watermarked noise image which can be added to the real images to have them falsely flagged as watermarked ones. Finally, we extend our theory to characterize a fundamental trade-off between the robustness and reliability of classifier-based deep fake detectors and demonstrate it through experiments. Code is available at https://github.com/mehrdadsaberi/watermark_robustness.

Recent developments in neural architecture search (NAS) emphasize the significance of considering robust architectures against malicious data. However, there is a notable absence of benchmark evaluations and theoretical guarantees for searching these robust architectures, especially when adversarial training is considered. In this work, we aim to address these two challenges, making twofold contributions. First, we release a comprehensive data set that encompasses both clean accuracy and robust accuracy for a vast array of adversarially trained networks from the NAS-Bench-201 search space on image datasets. Then, leveraging the neural tangent kernel (NTK) tool from deep learning theory, we establish a generalization theory for searching architecture in terms of clean accuracy and robust accuracy under multi-objective adversarial training. We firmly believe that our benchmark and theoretical insights will significantly benefit the NAS community through reliable reproducibility, efficient assessment, and theoretical foundation, particularly in the pursuit of robust architectures.

Convex relaxations are a key component of training and certifying provably safe neural networks. However, despite substantial progress, a wide and poorly understood accuracy gap to standard networks remains, raising the question of whether this is due to fundamental limitations of convex relaxations. Initial work investigating this question focused on the simple and widely used IBP relaxation. It revealed that some univariate, convex, continuous piecewise linear (CPWL) functions cannot be encoded by any ReLU network such that its IBP-analysis is precise. To explore whether this limitation is shared by more advanced convex relaxations, we conduct the first in-depth study on the expressive power of ReLU networks across all commonly used convex relaxations. We show that: (i) more advanced relaxations allow a larger class of univariate functions to be expressed as precisely analyzable ReLU networks, (ii) more precise relaxations can allow exponentially larger solution spaces of ReLU networks encoding the same functions, and (iii) even using the most precise single-neuron relaxations, it is impossible to construct precisely analyzable ReLU networks that express multivariate, convex, monotone CPWL functions.

Multi-modal models have shown a promising capability to effectively integrate information from various sources, yet meanwhile, they are found vulnerable to pervasive perturbations, such as uni-modal attacks and missing conditions. To counter these perturbations, robust multi-modal representations are highly expected, which are positioned well away from the discriminative multi-modal decision boundary. In this paper, different from conventional empirical studies, we focus on a commonly used joint multi-modal framework and theoretically discover that larger uni-modal representation margins and more reliable integration for modalities are essential components for achieving higher robustness. This discovery can further explain the limitation of multi-modal robustness and the phenomenon that multi-modal models are often vulnerable to attacks on the specific modality. Moreover, our analysis reveals how the widespread issue, that the model has different preferences for modalities, limits the multi-modal robustness by influencing the essential components and could lead to attacks on the specific modality highly effective. Inspired by our theoretical finding, we introduce a training procedure called Certifiable Robust Multi-modal Training (CRMT), which can alleviate this influence from modality preference and explicitly regulate essential components to significantly improve robustness in a certifiable manner. Our method demonstrates substantial improvements in performance and robustness compared with existing methods. Furthermore, our training procedure can be easily extended to enhance other robust training strategies, highlighting its credibility and flexibility.

Conformal prediction has shown spurring performance in constructing statistically rigorous prediction sets for arbitrary black-box machine learning models, assuming the data is exchangeable. However, even small adversarial perturbations during the inference can violate the exchangeability assumption, challenge the coverage guarantees, and result in a subsequent decline in empirical coverage. In this work, we propose a certifiably robust learning-reasoning conformal prediction framework (COLEP) via probabilistic circuits, which comprise a data-driven learning component that trains statistical models to learn different semantic concepts, and a reasoning component that encodes knowledge and characterizes the relationships among the trained models for logic reasoning. To achieve exact and efficient reasoning, we employ probabilistic circuits (PCs) within the reasoning component. Theoretically, we provide end-to-end certification of prediction coverage for COLEP in the presence of $\ell_2$ bounded adversarial perturbations. We also provide certified coverage considering the finite size of the calibration set. Furthermore, we prove that COLEP achieves higher prediction coverage and accuracy over a single model as long as the utilities of knowledge models are non-trivial. Empirically, we show the validity and tightness of our certified coverage, demonstrating the robust conformal prediction of COLEP on various datasets, including GTSRB, CIFAR10, and AwA2. We show that COLEP achieves up to 12% improvement in certified coverage on GTSRB, 9% on CIFAR-10, and 14% on AwA2.

One prominent approach toward resolving the adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks is the two-player zero-sum paradigm of adversarial training, in which predictors are trained against adversarially chosen perturbations of data. Despite the promise of this approach, algorithms based on this paradigm have not engendered sufficient levels of robustness and suffer from pathological behavior like robust overfitting. To understand this shortcoming, we first show that the commonly used surrogate-based relaxation used in adversarial training algorithms voids all guarantees on the robustness of trained classifiers. The identification of this pitfall informs a novel non-zero-sum bilevel formulation of adversarial training, wherein each player optimizes a different objective function. Our formulation yields a simple algorithmic framework that matches and in some cases outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, attains comparable levels of robustness to standard adversarial training algorithms, and does not suffer from robust overfitting.

It is not fully understood why adversarial examples can deceive neural networks and transfer between different networks. To elucidate this, several studies have hypothesized that adversarial perturbations, while appearing as noises, contain class features. This is supported by empirical evidence showing that networks trained on mislabeled adversarial examples can still generalize well to correctly labeled test samples. However, a theoretical understanding of how perturbations include class features and contribute to generalization is limited. In this study, we provide a theoretical framework for understanding learning from perturbations using a one-hidden-layer network trained on mutually orthogonal samples. Our results highlight that various adversarial perturbations, even perturbations of a few pixels, contain sufficient class features for generalization. Moreover, we reveal that the decision boundary when learning from perturbations matches that from standard samples except for specific regions under mild conditions. The code is available at https://github.com/s-kumano/learning-from-adversarial-perturbations.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM’s adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM’s adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions. Our source code is available at https://github.com/GodXuxilie/PromptAttack.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.