NeurIPS 2025 论文列表

Agnostic learning of Boolean halfspaces is a fundamental problem in computational learning theory, but it is known to be computationally hard even for weak learning. Recent work \citep{chandrasekaran2024smoothed} proposed smoothed analysis as a way to bypass such hardness, but existing frameworks rely on additive Gaussian perturbations, making them unsuitable for discrete domains. We introduce a new smoothed agnostic learning framework for Boolean inputs, where perturbations are modeled via random bit flips. This defines a natural discrete analogue of smoothed optimality generalizing the Gaussian case. Under strictly subexponential assumptions on the input distribution, we give an efficient algorithm for learning halfspaces in this model, with runtime and sample complexity $\tilde{O}(n^{\mathrm{poly}(\frac{1}{\sigma\epsilon})})$. Previously, such algorithms were known only with strong structural assumptions for the discrete hypercube—for example, independent coordinates or symmetric distributions. Our result provides the first computationally efficient guarantee for smoothed agnostic learning of halfspaces over the Boolean hypercube, bridging the gap between worst-case intractability and practical learnability in discrete settings.

Traditional Federated Learning (FL) approaches assume collaborative clients with aligned objectives working towards a shared global model. However, in many real-world scenarios, clients act as rational players with individual objectives and strategic behaviors, a concept that existing FL frameworks are not equipped to adequately address. To bridge this gap, we introduce *Multiplayer Federated Learning (MpFL)*, a novel framework that models the clients in the FL environment as players in a game-theoretic context, aiming to reach an equilibrium. In this scenario, each player tries to optimize their own utility function, which may not align with the collective goal. Within MpFL, we propose *Per-Player Local Stochastic Gradient Descent (PEARL-SGD)*, an algorithm in which each player/client performs local updates independently and periodically communicates with other players. We theoretically analyze PEARL-SGD and prove that it reaches a neighborhood of equilibrium with less communication in the stochastic setup compared to its non-local counterpart. Finally, we verify our theoretical findings through numerical experiments.

We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over $T$ rounds) that depend on the observable $d$-dimensional context and receives binary purchase feedback. Unlike prior work assuming homogeneous buyer types, in our setting the buyer's valuation type is drawn from an unknown distribution with finite support size $K_{\star}$. We develop a contextual pricing algorithm based on optimistic posterior sampling with regret $\widetilde{O}(K_{\star}\sqrt{dT})$, which we prove to be tight in $d$ and $T$ up to logarithmic terms. Finally, we refine our analysis for the non-contextual pricing case, proposing a variance-aware zooming algorithm that achieves the optimal dependence on $K_{\star}$.

The *law of supply and demand* asserts that in a perfectly competitive market, the price of a good adjusts to a *market clearing price*. In a market clearing price $p^\star$ the number of sellers willing to sell the good at $p^\star$ equals the number of sellers willing to buy the good at price $p^\star$. In this work, we provide a mathematical foundation on the law of supply and demand through the lens of online learning. Specifically, we demonstrate that if each seller employs a no-swap regret algorithm to set their individual selling price—aiming to maximize its individual revenue—the collective pricing dynamics converge to the market-clearing price $p^\star$ . Our findings offer a novel perspective on the law of supply and demand, framing it as the emergent outcome of an adaptive learning processes among sellers.

Many emerging applications—such as adversarial training, AI alignment, and robust optimization—can be framed as zero-sum games between neural nets, with von Neumann–Nash equilibria (NE) capturing the desirable system behavior. While such games often involve non-convex non-concave objectives, empirical evidence shows that simple gradient methods frequently converge, suggesting a hidden geometric structure. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework that explains this phenomenon through the lens of \emph{hidden convexity} and \emph{overparameterization}. We identify sufficient conditions spanning initialization, training dynamics, and network width—that guarantee global convergence to a NE in a broad class of non-convex min-max games. To our knowledge, this is the first such result for games that involve two-layer neural networks. Technically, our approach is twofold: (a) we derive a novel path-length bound for alternating gradient-descent-ascent scheme in min-max games; and (b) we show that games with hidden convex–concave geometry reduce to settings satisfying two-sided Polyak–Łojasiewicz (PL) and smoothness conditions, which hold with high probability under overparameterization, using tools from random matrix theory.

Hypergraphs effectively model higher-order relationships in natural phenomena, capturing complex interactions beyond pairwise connections. We introduce a novel hypergraph message passing framework inspired by interacting particle systems, where hyperedges act as fields inducing shared node dynamics. By incorporating attraction, repulsion, and Allen-Cahn forcing terms, particles of varying classes and features achieve class-dependent equilibrium, enabling separability through the particle-driven message passing. We investigate both first-order and second-order particle system equations for modeling these dynamics, which mitigate over-smoothing and heterophily thus can capture complete interactions. The more stable second-order system permits deeper message passing. Furthermore, we enhance deterministic message passing with stochastic element to account for interaction uncertainties. We prove theoretically that our approach mitigates over-smoothing by maintaining a positive lower bound on the hypergraph Dirichlet energy during propagation and thus to enable hypergraph message passing to go deep. Empirically, our models demonstrate competitive performance on diverse real-world hypergraph node classification tasks, excelling on both homophilic and heterophilic datasets. Source code is available at \href{https://github.com/Xuan-Elfin/HAMP}{the link}.

Game-theoretic algorithms are commonly benchmarked on recreational games, classical constructs from economic theory such as congestion and dispersion games, or entirely random game instances. While the past two decades have seen the rise of security games -- grounded in real-world scenarios like patrolling and infrastructure protection -- their practical evaluation has been hindered by limited access to the datasets used to generate them. In particular, although the structural components of these games (e.g., patrol paths derived from maps) can be replicated, the critical data defining target values -- central to utility modeling -- remain inaccessible. In this paper, we introduce a flexible framework that leverages open-access datasets to generate realistic matrix and security game instances. These include animal movement data for modeling anti-poaching scenarios and demographic and infrastructure data for infrastructure protection. Our framework allows users to customize utility functions and game parameters, while also offering a suite of preconfigured instances. We provide theoretical results highlighting the degeneracy and limitations of benchmarking on random games, and empirically compare our generated games against random baselines across a variety of standard algorithms for computing Nash and Stackelberg equilibria, including linear programming, incremental strategy generation, and self-play with no-regret learners.

We consider the problem of scheduling $m$ jobs on $n$ unrelated strategic machines to minimize the maximum load of any machine, but the machines are strategic and may misreport processing times to minimize their own load. The pioneering work of Nisan and Ronen gave an $n$-approximate deterministic strategyproof mechanism for this setting, and this was recently shown to be best possible by the breakthrough results of Christodoulou et al. This large approxation guarantee begs the question: how can we avoid these large worst-case results. In this work, we use the powerful framework of algorithms with (machine-learned) predictions to bypass these strong impossibility results. We show how we can predict $O(m+n)$ values to obtain a deterministic strategyproof algorithm whose makespan is within a constant factor of the optimal makespan when the predictions are correct, and $O(n)$ times the optimum no matter how poor the predictions are.