ICML 2025 论文列表

Although Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) have achieved remarkable success across various tasks, they still suffer from limited generalization. We hypothesize that this limitation arises from the traditional sample-based (0--dimensionnal) regularization used in ANNs. To overcome this, we introduce Deep Sturm-Liouville (DSL), a novel function approximator that enables continuous 1D regularization along field lines in the input space by integrating the Sturm-Liouville Theorem (SLT) into the deep learning framework. DSL defines field lines traversing the input space, along which a Sturm-Liouville problem is solved to generate orthogonal basis functions, enforcing implicit regularization thanks to the desirable properties of SLT. These basis functions are linearly combined to construct the DSL approximator. Both the vector field and basis functions are parameterized by neural networks and learned jointly. We demonstrate that the DSL formulation naturally arises when solving a Rank-1 Parabolic Eigenvalue Problem. DSL is trained efficiently using stochastic gradient descent via implicit differentiation and achieves competitive performance on diverse multivariate datasets, including high-dimensional image datasets such as MNIST and CIFAR-10.

Iterative extension of empirical game models through deep reinforcement learning (RL) has proved an effective approach for finding equilibria in complex games. When multiple equilibria exist, we may also be interested in finding solutions with particular characteristics. We address this issue of equilibrium selection in the context of Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), a flexible game-solving framework based on deep RL, by skewing the strategy exploration process towards higher-welfare solutions. At each iteration, we create an exploration policy that imitates high welfare-yielding behavior and train a response to the current solution, regularized to be similar to the exploration policy. With no additional simulation expense, our approach, named Ex$^2$PSRO, tends to find higher welfare equilibria than vanilla PSRO in two benchmarks: a sequential bargaining game and a social dilemma game. Further experiments demonstrate Ex$^2$PSRO's composability with other PSRO variants and illuminate the relationship between exploration policy choice and algorithmic performance.

We extend anytime constraints to the Markov game setting and the corresponding solution concept of anytime-constrained equilibrium (ACE). Then, we present a comprehensive theory of anytime-constrained equilibria that includes (1) a computational characterization of feasible policies, (2) a fixed-parameter tractable algorithm for computing ACE, and (3) a polynomial-time algorithm for approximately computing ACE. Since computing a feasible policy is NP-hard even for two-player zero-sum games, our approximation guarantees are the best possible so long as $P \neq NP$. We also develop the first theory of efficient computation for action-constrained Markov games, which may be of independent interest.

Since Polyak's pioneering work, heavy ball (HB) momentum has been widely studied in minimization. However, its role in min-max games remains largely unexplored. As a key component of practical min-max algorithms like Adam, this gap limits their effectiveness. In this paper, we present a continuous-time analysis for HB with simultaneous and alternating update schemes in min-max games. Locally, we prove *smaller* momentum enhances algorithmic stability by enabling local convergence across a wider range of step sizes, with alternating updates generally converging faster. Globally, we study the implicit regularization of HB, and find *smaller* momentum guides algorithms trajectories towards shallower slope regions of the loss landscapes, with alternating updates amplifying this effect. Surprisingly, all these phenomena differ from those observed in minimization, where *larger* momentum yields similar effects. Our results reveal fundamental differences between HB in min-max games and minimization, and numerical experiments further validate our theoretical results.

We study the design of *iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs)*. The main challenge in this domain is that the bundle space grows exponentially in the number of items. To address this, recent work has proposed machine learning (ML)-based preference elicitation algorithms that aim to elicit only the most critical information from bidders to maximize efficiency. However, while the SOTA ML-based algorithms elicit bidders' preferences via *value queries*, ICAs that are used in practice elicit information via *demand queries*. In this paper, we introduce a novel ML algorithm that provably makes use of the full information from both value and demand queries, and we show via experiments that combining both query types results in significantly better learning performance in practice. Building on these insights, we present MLHCA, a new ML-powered auction that uses value and demand queries. MLHCA significantly outperforms the previous SOTA, reducing efficiency loss by up to a factor 10, with up to 58% fewer queries. Thus, MLHCA achieves large efficiency improvements while also reducing bidders' cognitive load, establishing a new benchmark for both practicability and efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/marketdesignresearch/MLHCA.

Anti-viral therapies are typically designed to target only the current strains of a virus, a *myopic* response. However, therapy-induced selective pressures drive the emergence of new viral strains, against which the original myopic therapies are no longer effective. This evolutionary response presents an opportunity: our therapies could both *defend against and actively influence viral evolution*. This motivates our method ADIOS: Antibody Development vIa Opponent Shaping. ADIOS is a meta-learning framework where the process of antibody therapy design, the *outer loop*, accounts for the virus's adaptive response, the *inner loop*. With ADIOS, antibodies are not only robust against potential future variants, they also influence, i.e. *shape*, which future variants emerge. In line with the opponent shaping literature, we refer to our optimised antibodies as *shapers*. To demonstrate the value of ADIOS, we build a viral evolution simulator using the Absolut! framework, in which shapers successfully target both current and future viral variants, outperforming myopic antibodies. Furthermore, we show that shapers modify the distribution over viral evolutionary trajectories to result in weaker variants. We believe that our ADIOS paradigm will facilitate the discovery of long-lived vaccines and antibody therapies while also generalising to other domains. Specifically, domains such as antimicrobial resistance, cancer treatment, and others with evolutionarily adaptive opponents. Our code is available at https://github.com/olakalisz/adios.