VeinPhantom: Electromagnetic Side-channel Eavesdropping on Palm Vein Information

摘要

Palm vein recognition has gained traction in secure authentication due to its unique, stable, and inherently concealed biometric characteristics. However, the electromagnetic (EM) emissions from subcutaneous vein imaging sensors (SVIS) may unintentionally leak sensitive biometric information, fundamentally challenging the assumed security guarantees. In this paper, we propose VeinPhantom, a novel side-channel attack that reconstructs palm vein patterns from unintended EM emissions of SVIS, ultimately enabling spoofing attacks against biometric authentication systems. To overcome the challenge of low information entropy caused by weak EM signals and complex environmental interference, VeinPhantom first analyzes palm vein information from EM signals, then employs a cascaded enhancement strategy and incorporates a Dynamic Guidance Diffusion framework to progressively reconstruct high-fidelity palm vein patterns. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VeinPhantom achieves an average structure similarity index measure (SSIM) of 0.56 on commercial devices, along with a 56.96% spoofing success rate against state-of-the-art authentication systems. We further discuss potential mitigation strategies to defend against the attack.