Backdoor Attacks

Recently, Anil et al. (2024) show that many-shot (up to hundreds of) demonstrations can jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs by exploiting their long-context capability. Nevertheless, is it possible to use few-shot demonstrations to efficiently jailbreak LLMs within limited context sizes? While the vanilla few-shot jailbreaking may be inefficient, we propose improved techniques such as injecting special system tokens like [/INST] and employing demo-level random search from a collected demo pool. These simple techniques result in surprisingly effective jailbreaking against aligned LLMs (even with advanced defenses). For example, our method achieves >80% (mostly >95%) ASRs on Llama-2-7B and Llama-3-8B without multiple restarts, even if the models are enhanced by strong defenses such as perplexity detection and/or SmoothLLM, which is challenging for suffix-based jailbreaking. In addition, we conduct comprehensive and elaborate (e.g., making sure to use correct system prompts) evaluations against other aligned LLMs and advanced defenses, where our method consistently achieves nearly 100% ASRs. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/I-FSJ.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities in executing complex tasks in a zero-shot manner, they are susceptible to jailbreak attacks and can be manipulated to produce harmful outputs. Recently, a growing body of research has categorized jailbreak attacks into token-level and prompt-level attacks. However, previous work primarily overlooks the diverse key factors of jailbreak attacks, with most studies concentrating on LLM vulnerabilities and lacking exploration of defense-enhanced LLMs. To address these issues, we introduced JailTrickBench to evaluate the impact of various attack settings on LLM performance and provide a baseline for jailbreak attacks, encouraging the adoption of a standardized evaluation framework. Specifically, we evaluate the eight key factors of implementing jailbreak attacks on LLMs from both target-level and attack-level perspectives. We further conduct seven representative jailbreak attacks on six defense methods across two widely used datasets, encompassing approximately 354 experiments with about 55,000 GPU hours on A800-80G. Our experimental results highlight the need for standardized benchmarking to evaluate these attacks on defense-enhanced LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/usail-hkust/JailTrickBench.

Text watermarks for large language models (LLMs) have been commonly used to identify the origins of machine-generated content, which is promising for assessing liability when combating deepfake or harmful content. While existing watermarking techniques typically prioritize robustness against removal attacks, unfortunately, they are vulnerable to spoofing attacks: malicious actors can subtly alter the meanings of LLM-generated responses or even forge harmful content, potentially misattributing blame to the LLM developer. To overcome this, we introduce a bi-level signature scheme, Bileve, which embeds fine-grained signature bits for integrity checks (mitigating spoofing attacks) as well as a coarse-grained signal to trace text sources when the signature is invalid (enhancing detectability) via a novel rank-based sampling strategy. Compared to conventional watermark detectors that only output binary results, Bileve can differentiate 5 scenarios during detection, reliably tracing text provenance and regulating LLMs. The experiments conducted on OPT-1.3B and LLaMA-7B demonstrate the effectiveness of Bileve in defeating spoofing attacks with enhanced detectability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are becoming a prominent generative AI tool, where the user enters a query and the LLM generates an answer. To reduce harm and misuse, efforts have been made to align these LLMs to human values using advanced training techniques such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). However, recent studies have highlighted the vulnerability of LLMs to adversarial jailbreak attempts aiming at subverting the embedded safety guardrails. To address this challenge, this paper defines and investigates the **Refusal Loss** of LLMs and then proposes a method called **Gradient Cuff** to detect jailbreak attempts. Gradient Cuff exploits the unique properties observed in the refusal loss landscape, including functional values and its smoothness, to design an effective two-step detection strategy. Experimental results on two aligned LLMs (LLaMA-2-7B-Chat and Vicuna-7B-V1.5) and six types of jailbreak attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR, TAP, Base64, and LRL) show that Gradient Cuff can significantly improve the LLM's rejection capability for malicious jailbreak queries, while maintaining the model's performance for benign user queries by adjusting the detection threshold.

Data valuation has emerged as a powerful framework for quantifying each datum's contribution to the training of a machine learning model. However, it is crucial to recognize that the quality of cells within a single data point can vary greatly in practice. For example, even in the case of an abnormal data point, not all cells are necessarily noisy. The single scalar score assigned by existing data valuation methods blurs the distinction between noisy and clean cells of a data point, making it challenging to interpret the data values. In this paper, we propose 2D-OOB, an out-of-bag estimation framework for jointly determining helpful (or detrimental) samples as well as the particular cells that drive them. Our comprehensive experiments demonstrate that 2D-OOB achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple use cases while being exponentially faster. Specifically, 2D-OOB shows promising results in detecting and rectifying fine-grained outliers at the cell level, and localizing backdoor triggers in data poisoning attacks.

Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) as they allow attackers to manipulate model predictions with backdoor triggers. To address these security vulnerabilities, various backdoor purification methods have been proposed to purify compromised models. Typically, these purified models exhibit low Attack Success Rates (ASR), rendering them resistant to backdoored inputs. However, \textit{Does achieving a low ASR through current safety purification methods truly eliminate learned backdoor features from the pretraining phase?} In this paper, we provide an affirmative answer to this question by thoroughly investigating the \textit{Post-Purification Robustness} of current backdoor purification methods. We find that current safety purification methods are vulnerable to the rapid re-learning of backdoor behavior, even when further fine-tuning of purified models is performed using a very small number of poisoned samples. Based on this, we further propose the practical Query-based Reactivation Attack (QRA) which could effectively reactivate the backdoor by merely querying purified models. We find the failure to achieve satisfactory post-purification robustness stems from the insufficient deviation of purified models from the backdoored model along the backdoor-connected path. To improve the post-purification robustness, we propose a straightforward tuning defense, Path-Aware Minimization (PAM), which promotes deviation along backdoor-connected paths with extra model updates. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PAM significantly improves post-purification robustness while maintaining a good clean accuracy and low ASR. Our work provides a new perspective on understanding the effectiveness of backdoor safety tuning and highlights the importance of faithfully assessing the model's safety.

We reveal the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models, and present new methods which can do so without requiring retraining. Our theoretical insights show that a single metric (a measure of the intrinsic dimension of the model's features) can be used to assess a model's editability and reveals its previously unrecognised susceptibility to malicious *stealth attacks*. This metric is fundamental to predicting the success of a variety of editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these as *stealth editing* methods, because they directly update a model's weights to specify its response to specific known hallucinating prompts without affecting other model behaviour. By carefully applying our theoretical insights, we are able to introduce a new *jet-pack* network block which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. We also reveal the vulnerability of language models to stealth attacks: a small change to a model's weights which fixes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks are computationally simple, do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, and therefore represent a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support our methods and their theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.

In model inversion attacks (MIAs), adversaries attempt to recover private training data by exploiting access to a well-trained target model. Recent advancements have improved MIA performance using a two-stage generative framework. This approach first employs a generative adversarial network to learn a fixed distributional prior, which is then used to guide the inversion process during the attack. However, in this paper, we observed a phenomenon that such a fixed prior would lead to a low probability of sampling actual private data during the inversion process due to the inherent distribution gap between the prior distribution and the private data distribution, thereby constraining attack performance. To address this limitation, we propose increasing the density around high-quality pseudo-private data—recovered samples through model inversion that exhibit characteristics of the private training data—by slightly tuning the generator. This strategy effectively increases the probability of sampling actual private data that is close to these pseudo-private data during the inversion process. After integrating our method, the generative model inversion pipeline is strengthened, leading to improvements over state-of-the-art MIAs. This paves the way for new research directions in generative MIAs.

Backdoor attacks aim to inject a backdoor into a classifier such that it predicts any input with an attacker-chosen backdoor trigger as an attacker-chosen target class. Existing backdoor attacks require either retraining the classifier with some clean data or modifying the model's architecture. As a result, they are 1) not applicable when clean data is unavailable, 2) less efficient when the model is large, and 3) less stealthy due to architecture changes. In this work, we propose DFBA, a novel retraining-free and data-free backdoor attack without changing the model architecture. Technically, our proposed method modifies a few parameters of a classifier to inject a backdoor. Through theoretical analysis, we verify that our injected backdoor is provably undetectable and unremovable by various state-of-the-art defenses under mild assumptions. Our evaluation on multiple datasets further demonstrates that our injected backdoor: 1) incurs negligible classification loss, 2) achieves 100\% attack success rates, and 3) bypasses six existing state-of-the-art defenses. Moreover, our comparison with a state-of-the-art non-data-free backdoor attack shows our attack is more stealthy and effective against various defenses while achieving less classification accuracy loss. We will release our code upon paper acceptance.

Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) excel across various applications but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, particularly Graph Injection Attacks (GIAs), which inject malicious nodes into the original graph and pose realistic threats. Text-attributed graphs (TAGs), where nodes are associated with textual features, are crucial due to their prevalence in real-world applications and are commonly used to evaluate these vulnerabilities. However, existing research only focuses on embedding-level GIAs, which inject node embeddings rather than actual textual content, limiting their applicability and simplifying detection. In this paper, we pioneer the exploration of GIAs at the text level, presenting three novel attack designs that inject textual content into the graph. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we demonstrate that text interpretability, a factor previously overlooked at the embedding level, plays a crucial role in attack strength. Among the designs we investigate, the Word-frequency-based Text-level GIA (WTGIA) is particularly notable for its balance between performance and interpretability. Despite the success of WTGIA, we discover that defenders can easily enhance their defenses with customized text embedding methods or large language model (LLM)--based predictors. These insights underscore the necessity for further research into the potential and practical significance of text-level GIAs.

Scanning for trojan (backdoor) in deep neural networks is crucial due to their significant real-world applications. There has been an increasing focus on developing effective general trojan scanning methods across various trojan attacks. Despite advancements, there remains a shortage of methods that perform effectively without preconceived assumptions about the backdoor attack method. Additionally, we have observed that current methods struggle to identify classifiers trojaned using adversarial training. Motivated by these challenges, our study introduces a novel scanning method named TRODO (TROjan scanning by Detection of adversarial shifts in Out-of-distribution samples). TRODO leverages the concept of "blind spots"—regions where trojaned classifiers erroneously identify out-of-distribution (OOD) samples as in-distribution (ID). We scan for these blind spots by adversarially shifting OOD samples towards in-distribution. The increased likelihood of perturbed OOD samples being classified as ID serves as a signature for trojan detection. TRODO is both trojan and label mapping agnostic, effective even against adversarially trained trojaned classifiers. It is applicable even in scenarios where training data is absent, demonstrating high accuracy and adaptability across various scenarios and datasets, highlighting its potential as a robust trojan scanning strategy.

Many studies have proposed attack methods to generate adversarial patterns for evading pedestrian detection, alarming the computer vision community about the need for more attention to the robustness of detectors. However, adversarial patterns optimized by these methods commonly have limited performance at medium to long distances in the physical world. To overcome this limitation, we identify two main challenges. First, in existing methods, there is commonly an appearance gap between simulated distant adversarial patterns and their physical world counterparts, leading to incorrect optimization. Second, there exists a conflict between adversarial losses at different distances, which causes difficulties in optimization. To overcome these challenges, we introduce a Full Distance Attack (FDA) method. Our physical world experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our FDA patterns across various detection models like YOLOv5, Deformable-DETR, and Mask RCNN. Codes available at https://github.com/zhicheng2T0/Full-Distance-Attack.git

Language models have shown vulnerability against backdoor attacks, threatening the security of services based on them. To mitigate the threat, existing solutions attempted to search for backdoor triggers, which can be time-consuming when handling a large search space. Looking into the attack process, we observe that poisoned data will create a long-tailed effect in the victim model, causing the decision boundary to shift towards the attack targets. Inspired by this observation, we introduce LT-Defense, the first searching-free backdoor defense via exploiting the long-tailed effect. Specifically, LT-Defense employs a small set of clean examples and two metrics to distinguish backdoor-related features in the target model. Upon detecting a backdoor model, LT-Defense additionally provides test-time backdoor freezing and attack target prediction. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of LT-Defense in both detection accuracy and efficiency, e.g., in task-agnostic scenarios, LT-Defense achieves 98% accuracy across 1440 models with less than 1% of the time cost of state-of-the-art solutions.

Machine unlearning is motivated by principles of data autonomy. The premise is that a person can request to have their data's influence removed from deployed models, and those models should be updated as if they were retrained without the person's data. We show that these updates expose individuals to high-accuracy reconstruction attacks which allow the attacker to recover their data in its entirety, even when the original models are so simple that privacy risk might not otherwise have been a concern. We show how to mount a near-perfect attack on the deleted data point from linear regression models. We then generalize our attack to other loss functions and architectures, and empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks across a wide range of datasets (capturing both tabular and image data). Our work highlights that privacy risk is significant even for extremely simple model classes when individuals can request deletion of their data from the model.

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to federated systems, where malicious clients optimize on the triggered distribution to mislead the global model towards a predefined target. Existing backdoor defense methods typically require either homogeneous assumption, validation datasets, or client optimization conflicts. In our work, we observe that benign heterogeneous distributions and malicious triggered distributions exhibit distinct parameter importance degrees. We introduce the Fisher Discrepancy Cluster and Rescale (FDCR) method, which utilizes Fisher Information to calculate the degree of parameter importance for local distributions. This allows us to reweight client parameter updates and identify those with large discrepancies as backdoor attackers. Furthermore, we prioritize rescaling important parameters to expedite adaptation to the target distribution, encouraging significant elements to contribute more while diminishing the influence of trivial ones. This approach enables FDCR to handle backdoor attacks in heterogeneous federated learning environments. Empirical results on various heterogeneous federated scenarios under backdoor attacks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

Data-poisoning backdoor attacks are serious security threats to machine learning models, where an adversary can manipulate the training dataset to inject backdoors into models. In this paper, we focus on in-training backdoor defense, aiming to train a clean model even when the dataset may be potentially poisoned. Unlike most existing methods that primarily detect and remove/unlearn suspicious samples to mitigate malicious backdoor attacks, we propose a novel defense approach called PDB (Proactive Defensive Backdoor). Specifically, PDB leverages the “home field” advantage of defenders by proactively injecting a defensive backdoor into the model during training. Taking advantage of controlling the training process, the defensive backdoor is designed to suppress the malicious backdoor effectively while remaining secret to attackers. In addition, we introduce a reversible mapping to determine the defensive target label. During inference, PDB embeds a defensive trigger in the inputs and reverses the model’s prediction, suppressing malicious backdoor and ensuring the model's utility on the original task. Experimental results across various datasets and models demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art defense performance against a wide range of backdoor attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/shawkui/Proactive_Defensive_Backdoor.

Backdoor attacks on deep learning represent a recent threat that has gained significant attention in the research community. Backdoor defenses are mainly based on backdoor inversion, which has been shown to be generic, model-agnostic, and applicable to practical threat scenarios. State-of-the-art backdoor inversion recovers a mask in the feature space to locate prominent backdoor features, where benign and backdoor features can be disentangled. However, it suffers from high computational overhead, and we also find that it overly relies on prominent backdoor features that are highly distinguishable from benign features. To tackle these shortcomings, this paper improves backdoor feature inversion for backdoor detection by incorporating extra neuron activation information. In particular, we adversarially increase the loss of backdoored models with respect to weights to activate the backdoor effect, based on which we can easily differentiate backdoored and clean models. Experimental results demonstrate our defense, BAN, is 1.37$\times$ (on CIFAR-10) and 5.11$\times$ (on ImageNet200) more efficient with an average 9.99\% higher detect success rate than the state-of-the-art defense BTI DBF. Our code and trained models are publicly available at https://github.com/xiaoyunxxy/ban.

The rapid proliferation of open-source language models significantly increases the risks of downstream backdoor attacks. These backdoors can introduce dangerous behaviours during model deployment and can evade detection by conventional cybersecurity monitoring systems. In this paper, we introduce a novel class of backdoors in transformer models, that, in contrast to prior art, are unelicitable in nature. Unelicitability prevents the defender from triggering the backdoor, making it impossible to properly evaluate ahead of deployment even if given full white-box access and using automated techniques, such as red-teaming or certain formal verification methods. We show that our novel construction is not only unelicitable thanks to using cryptographic techniques, but also has favourable robustness properties. We confirm these properties in empirical investigations, and provide evidence that our backdoors can withstand state-of-the-art mitigation strategies. Additionally, we expand on previous work by showing that our universal backdoors, while not completely undetectable in white-box settings, can be harder to detect than some existing designs. By demonstrating the feasibility of seamlessly integrating backdoors into transformer models, this paper fundamentally questions the efficacy of pre-deployment detection strategies. This offers new insights into the offence-defence balance in AI safety and security.

We introduce One-Shot Label-Only (OSLO) membership inference attacks (MIAs), which accurately infer a given sample's membership in a target model's training set with high precision using just a single query, where the target model only returns the predicted hard label. This is in contrast to state-of-the-art label-only attacks which require $\sim6000$ queries, yet get attack precisions lower than OSLO's. OSLO leverages transfer-based black-box adversarial attacks. The core idea is that a member sample exhibits more resistance to adversarial perturbations than a non-member. We compare OSLO against state-of-the-art label-only attacks and demonstrate that, despite requiring only one query, our method significantly outperforms previous attacks in terms of precision and true positive rate (TPR) under the same false positive rates (FPR). For example, compared to previous label-only MIAs, OSLO achieves a TPR that is at least 7$\times$ higher under a 1\% FPR and at least 22$\times$ higher under a 0.1\% FPR on CIFAR100 for a ResNet18 model. We evaluated multiple defense mechanisms against OSLO.

The advancement of Machine Learning has enabled the widespread deployment of Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) applications. However, the untrustworthy nature of third-party ML services poses backdoor threats. Existing defenses in MLaaS are limited by their reliance on training samples or white-box model analysis, highlighting the need for a black-box backdoor purification method. In our paper, we attempt to use diffusion models for purification by introducing noise in a forward diffusion process to destroy backdoors and recover clean samples through a reverse generative process. However, since a higher noise also destroys the semantics of the original samples, it still results in a low restoration performance. To investigate the effectiveness of noise in eliminating different types of backdoors, we conducted a preliminary study, which demonstrates that backdoors with low visibility can be easily destroyed by lightweight noise and those with high visibility need to be destroyed by high noise but can be easily detected. Based on the study, we propose SampDetox, which strategically combines lightweight and high noise. SampDetox applies weak noise to eliminate low-visibility backdoors and compares the structural similarity between the recovered and original samples to localize high-visibility backdoors. Intensive noise is then applied to these localized areas, destroying the high-visibility backdoors while preserving global semantic information. As a result, detoxified samples can be used for inference, even by poisoned models. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of SampDetox in defending against various state-of-the-art backdoor attacks.