NeurIPS 2023 Papers

Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems

Decision breakdown

3,584papers

Counted from the official paper list; may differ slightly from the number the conference announced.

  • Oral
    772.1%
  • Spotlight
    40011.2%
  • Poster
    3,10786.7%

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Interpreting Unsupervised Anomaly Detection in Security via Rule Extraction

Ruoyu Li, Qing Li, Yu Zhang, Dan Zhao, Yong Jiang, Yong Yang

Expand abstract

Many security applications require unsupervised anomaly detection, as malicious data are extremely rare and often only unlabeled normal data are available for training (i.e., zero-positive). However, security operators are concerned about the high stakes of trusting black-box models due to their lack of interpretability. In this paper, we propose a post-hoc method to globally explain a black-box unsupervised anomaly detection model via rule extraction. First, we propose the concept of distribution decomposition rules that decompose the complex distribution of normal data into multiple compositional distributions. To find such rules, we design an unsupervised Interior Clustering Tree that incorporates the model prediction into the splitting criteria. Then, we propose the Compositional Boundary Exploration (CBE) algorithm to obtain the boundary inference rules that estimate the decision boundary of the original model on each compositional distribution. By merging these two types of rules into a rule set, we can present the inferential process of the unsupervised black-box model in a human-understandable way, and build a surrogate rule-based model for online deployment at the same time. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the explanation of four distinct unsupervised anomaly detection models on various real-world datasets. The evaluation shows that our method outperforms existing methods in terms of diverse metrics including fidelity, correctness and robustness.

Poster
Label Poisoning is All You Need

Rishi Dev Jha, Jonathan Hayase, Sewoong Oh

Expand abstract

In a backdoor attack, an adversary injects corrupted data into a model's training dataset in order to gain control over its predictions on images with a specific attacker-defined trigger. A typical corrupted training example requires altering both the image, by applying the trigger, and the label. Models trained on clean images, therefore, were considered safe from backdoor attacks. However, in some common machine learning scenarios, the training labels are provided by potentially malicious third-parties. This includes crowd-sourced annotation and knowledge distillation. We, hence, investigate a fundamental question: can we launch a successful backdoor attack by only corrupting labels? We introduce a novel approach to design label-only backdoor attacks, which we call FLIP, and demonstrate its strengths on three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet) and four architectures (ResNet-32, ResNet-18, VGG-19, and Vision Transformer). With only 2% of CIFAR-10 labels corrupted, FLIP achieves a near-perfect attack success rate of 99.4% while suffering only a 1.8% drop in the clean test accuracy. Our approach builds upon the recent advances in trajectory matching, originally introduced for dataset distillation.

Poster