ICML 2025 Papers

Artificial intelligence (AI) has surpassed top human players in a variety of games. In imperfect information games, these achievements have primarily been driven by Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) and its variants for computing Nash equilibrium. However, most existing research has focused on maximizing payoff, while largely neglecting the importance of strategic diversity and the need for varied play styles, thereby limiting AI’s adaptability to different user preferences. To address this gap, we propose Preference-CFR (Pref-CFR), a novel method that incorporates two key parameters: preference degree and vulnerability degree. These parameters enable the AI to adjust its strategic distribution within an acceptable performance loss threshold, thereby enhancing its adaptability to a wider range of strategic demands. In our experiments with Texas Hold’em, Pref-CFR successfully trained Aggressive and Loose Passive styles that not only match original CFR-based strategies in performance but also display clearly distinct behavioral patterns. Notably, for certain hand scenarios, Pref-CFR produces strategies that diverge significantly from both conventional expert heuristics and original CFR outputs, potentially offering novel insights for professional players.

We study the fair scheduling of jobs among groups of (unrelated) machines and focus on the maximin share (MMS) fairness at the group level. The problem was first introduced by Li et al. [NeurIPS 2023], where each group consists of a number of identical machines (or identical up to different speeds), and the cost of a group is determined by the minimum makespan on completing all jobs assigned to it. It is left as an open problem when the machines within each group are unrelated. In this paper, we first resolve this problem and design a polynomial-time algorithm that computes a 2-approximate MMS allocation via linear programming techniques. We complement this result with a hard instance, showing that no algorithm can be better than $(2-\frac{1}{n})$-approximate MMS, where $n$ is the number of machines. Thus the approximation ratio 2 is asymptotically tight. When the groups consist of identical machines, we improve the approximation ratio to $\frac{4}{3}$.

Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks (KANs) have seen great success in scientific domains thanks to spline activation functions, becoming an alternative to Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLPs). However, spline functions may not respect symmetry in tasks, which is crucial prior knowledge in machine learning. In this paper, we propose Equivariant Kolmogorov-Arnold Networks (EKAN), a method for incorporating arbitrary matrix group equivariance into KANs, aiming to broaden their applicability to more fields. We first construct gated spline basis functions, which form the EKAN layer together with equivariant linear weights, and then define a lift layer to align the input space of EKAN with the feature space of the dataset, thereby building the entire EKAN architecture. Compared with baseline models, EKAN achieves higher accuracy with smaller datasets or fewer parameters on symmetry-related tasks, such as particle scattering and the three-body problem, often reducing test MSE by several orders of magnitude. Even in non-symbolic formula scenarios, such as top quark tagging with three jet constituents, EKAN achieves comparable results with state-of-the-art equivariant architectures using fewer than $40\\%$ of the parameters, while KANs do not outperform MLPs as expected. Code and data are available at [https://github.com/hulx2002/EKAN](https://github.com/hulx2002/EKAN).

Multiwinner voting is the study of electing a fixed-size committee given individual agents' preferences over candidates. Most research in this field has been limited to a static setting, with only one election over a fixed set of candidates. However, this approach overlooks the dynamic nature of applications, where candidate sets are subject to change. We extend the study of proportionality in multiwinner voting to dynamic settings, allowing candidates to join or leave the election and demanding that each chosen committee satisfies proportionality without differing too much from the previously selected committee. We consider approval preferences, ranked preferences, and the proportional clustering setting. In these settings, we either give algorithms making few changes or show that such algorithms cannot exist for various proportionality axioms. In particular, we show that such algorithms cannot exist for ranked preferences and provide amortized and exact algorithms for several proportionality notions in the other two settings.

A key component of transformers is the attention mechanism orchestrating how each token influences the propagation of every other token along the layers of a transformer. In this paper we provide a rigorous, mathematical analysis of the asymptotic properties of attention in transformers. Although we present several results based on different assumptions, all of them point to the same conclusion, all tokens asymptotically converge to each other, a phenomenon that has been empirically reported in the literature. Our findings are carefully compared with existing theoretical results and illustrated by simulations and experimental studies using the GPT-2 model.

Aggregating preferences under incomplete or constrained feedback is a fundamental problem in social choice and related domains. While prior work has established strong impossibility results for pairwise comparisons, this paper extends the inquiry to improvement feedback, where voters express incremental adjustments rather than complete preferences. We provide a complete characterization of the positional scoring rules that can be computed given improvement feedback. Interestingly, while plurality is learnable under improvement feedback—unlike with pairwise feedback—strong impossibility results persist for many other positional scoring rules. Furthermore, we show that improvement feedback, unlike pairwise feedback, does not suffice for the computation of any Condorcet-consistent rule. We complement our theoretical findings with experimental results, providing further insights into the practical implications of improvement feedback for preference aggregation.

The rise of Generative AI (GenAI) has significantly impacted human-based forums like Stack Overflow, which are essential for generating high-quality data. This creates a negative feedback loop, hindering the development of GenAI systems, which rely on such data to provide accurate responses. In this paper, we provide a possible remedy: A novel strategy we call selective response. Selective response implies that GenAI could strategically provide inaccurate (or conservative) responses to queries involving emerging topics and novel technologies, thereby driving users to use human-based forums. We show that selective response can potentially have a compounding effect on the data generation process, increasing both GenAI's revenue and user welfare in the long term. From an algorithmic perspective, we propose an approximately optimal approach to maximize GenAI's revenue under social welfare constraints. From a regulatory perspective, we derive sufficient and necessary conditions for selective response to improve welfare.

Machine learning models play a key role for service providers looking to gain market share in consumer markets. However, traditional learning approaches do not take into account the existence of additional providers, who compete with each other for consumers. Our work aims to study learning in this market setting, as it affects providers, consumers, and the market itself. We begin by analyzing such markets through the lens of the learning objective, and show that accuracy cannot be the only consideration. We then propose a method for classification under competition, so that a learner can maximize market share in the presence of competitors. We show that our approach benefits the providers as well as the consumers, and find that the timing of market entry and model updates can be crucial. We display the effectiveness of our approach across a range of domains, from simple distributions to noisy datasets, and show that the market as a whole remains stable by converging quickly to an equilibrium.

As deep learning models are increasingly deployed in high-risk applications, robust defenses against adversarial attacks and reliable performance guarantees become paramount. Moreover, accuracy alone does not provide sufficient assurance or reliable uncertainty estimates for these models. This study advances adversarial training by leveraging principles from Conformal Prediction. Specifically, we develop an adversarial attack method, termed OPSA (OPtimal Size Attack), designed to reduce the efficiency of conformal prediction at any significance level by maximizing model uncertainty without requiring coverage guarantees. Correspondingly, we introduce OPSA-AT (Adversarial Training), a defense strategy that integrates OPSA within a novel conformal training paradigm. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our OPSA attack method induces greater uncertainty compared to baseline approaches for various defenses. Conversely, our OPSA-AT defensive model significantly enhances robustness not only against OPSA but also other adversarial attacks, and maintains reliable prediction. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of this integrated approach for developing trustworthy and resilient deep learning models for safety-critical domains. Our code is available at https://github.com/bjbbbb/Enhancing-Adversarial-Robustness-with-Conformal-Prediction.

We study the problem of learning in zero-sum matrix games with repeated play and bandit feedback. Specifically, we focus on developing uncoupled algorithms that guarantee, without communication between players, convergence of the last-iterate to a Nash equilibrium. Although the non-bandit case has been studied extensively, this setting has only been explored recently, with a bound of $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/8})$ on the exploitability gap. We show that, for uncoupled algorithms, guaranteeing convergence of the policy profiles to a Nash equilibrium is detrimental to the performances, with the best attainable rate being $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/4})$ in contrast to the usual $\mathcal{O}(T^{-1/2})$ rate for convergence of the average iterates. We then propose two algorithms that achieve this optimal rate. The first algorithm leverages a straightforward tradeoff between exploration and exploitation, while the second employs a regularization technique based on a two-step mirror descent approach.

We study a collaborative learning problem where $m$ agents aim to estimate a vector $\mu =(\mu_1,\ldots,\mu_d)\in \mathbb{R}^d$ by sampling from associated univariate normal distributions $(\mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma^2))\_{k\in[d]}$. Agent $i$ incurs a cost $c_{i,k}$ to sample from $\mathcal{N}(\mu_k, \sigma^2)$. Instead of working independently, agents can exchange data, collecting cheaper samples and sharing them in return for costly data, thereby reducing both costs and estimation error. We design a mechanism to facilitate such collaboration, while addressing two key challenges: ensuring *individually rational (IR) and fair outcomes* so all agents benefit, and *preventing strategic behavior* (e.g. non-collection, data fabrication) to avoid socially undesirable outcomes. We design a mechanism and an associated Nash equilibrium (NE) which minimizes the social penalty-sum of agents' estimation errors and collection costs-while being IR for all agents. We achieve a $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{m})$-approximation to the minimum social penalty in the worst case and an $\mathcal{O}(1)$-approximation under favorable conditions. Additionally, we establish three hardness results: no nontrivial mechanism guarantees *(i)* a dominant strategy equilibrium where agents report truthfully, *(ii)* is IR for every strategy profile of other agents, *(iii)* or avoids a worst-case $\Omega(\sqrt{m})$ price of stability in any NE. Finally, by integrating concepts from axiomatic bargaining, we demonstrate that our mechanism supports fairer outcomes than one which minimizes social penalty.

Existing works on the expressive power of neural networks typically assume real-valued parameters and exact mathematical operations during the evaluation of networks. However, neural networks run on actual computers can take parameters only from a small subset of the reals and perform inexact mathematical operations with round-off errors and overflows. In this work, we study the expressive power of floating-point neural networks, i.e., networks with floating-point parameters and operations. We first observe that for floating-point neural networks to represent all functions from floating-point vectors to floating-point vectors, it is necessary to distinguish different inputs: the first layer of a network should be able to generate different outputs for different inputs. We also prove that such distinguishability is sufficient, along with mild conditions on activation functions. Our result shows that with practical activation functions, floating-point neural networks can represent floating-point functions from a wide domain to all finite or infinite floats. For example, the domain is all finite floats for Sigmoid and tanh, and it is all finite floats of magnitude less than 1/8 times the largest float for ReLU, ELU, SeLU, GELU, Swish, Mish, and sin.

*Variational inequalities (VIs)* encompass many fundamental problems in diverse areas ranging from engineering to economics and machine learning. However, their considerable expressivity comes at the cost of computational intractability. In this paper, we introduce and analyze a natural relaxation—which we refer to as *expected variational inequalities (EVIs)*—where the goal is to find a distribution that satisfies the VI constraint in expectation. By adapting recent techniques from game theory, we show that, unlike VIs, EVIs can be solved in polynomial time under general (nonmonotone) operators. EVIs capture the seminal notion of correlated equilibria, but enjoy a greater reach beyond games. We also employ our framework to capture and generalize several existing disparate results, including from settings such as smooth games, and games with coupled constraints or nonconcave utilities.

Strategic classification addresses a learning problem where a decision-maker implements a classifier over agents who may manipulate their features in order to receive favorable predictions. In the standard model of online strategic classification, in each round, the decision-maker implements and publicly reveals a classifier, after which agents perfectly best respond based on this knowledge. However, in practice, whether to disclose the classifier is often debated---some decision-makers believe that hiding the classifier can prevent misclassification errors caused by manipulation. In this paper, we formally examine how limiting the agents' access to the current classifier affects the decision-maker's performance. Specifically, we consider an extended online strategic classification setting where agents lack direct knowledge about the current classifier and instead manipulate based on a weighted average of historically implemented classifiers. Our main result shows that in this setting, the decision-maker incurs $(1-\gamma)^{-1}$ or $k_{\text{in}}$ times more mistakes compared to the full-knowledge setting, where $k_{\text{in}}$ is the maximum in-degree of the manipulation graph (representing how many distinct feature vectors can be manipulated to appear as a single one), and $\gamma$ is the discount factor indicating agents' memory of past classifiers. Our results demonstrate how withholding access to the classifier can backfire and degrade the decision-maker's performance in online strategic classification.

Estimating the unknown reward functions driving agents' behavior is a central challenge in inverse games and reinforcement learning. This paper introduces a unified framework for reward function recovery in two-player zero-sum matrix games and Markov games with entropy regularization. Given observed player strategies and actions, we aim to reconstruct the underlying reward functions. This task is challenging due to the inherent ambiguity of inverse problems, the non-uniqueness of feasible rewards, and limited observational data coverage. To address these challenges, we establish reward function identifiability using the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) under linear assumptions. Building on this theoretical foundation, we propose an algorithm to learn reward from observed actions, designed to capture all plausible reward parameters by constructing confidence sets. Our algorithm works in both static and dynamic settings and is adaptable to incorporate other methods, such as Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). We provide strong theoretical guarantees for the reliability and sample-efficiency of our algorithm. Empirical results demonstrate the framework’s effectiveness in accurately recovering reward functions across various scenarios, offering new insights into decision-making in competitive environments.

Federated Learning (FL) enables collaborative training with privacy preservation but is vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where malicious clients degrade model performance on targeted inputs. These attacks exploit FL decentralized nature, while existing defenses, based on isolated behaviors and fixed rules, can be bypassed by adaptive attackers. To address these limitations, we propose **SPMC**, a marginal collaboration defense mechanism that leverages intrinsic consistency across clients to estimate inter-client marginal contributions. This allows the system to dynamically reduce the influence of clients whose behavior deviates from the collaborative norm, thus maintaining robustness even as the number of attackers changes. In addition to overcoming proxy-dependent purification's weaknesses, we introduce a self-purification process that locally adjusts suspicious gradients. By aligning them with margin-based model updates, we mitigate the effect of local poisoning. Together, these two modules significantly improve the adaptability and resilience of FL systems, both at the client and server levels. Experimental results on a variety of classification benchmarks demonstrate that SPMC achieves strong defense performance against sophisticated backdoor attacks without sacrificing accuracy on benign tasks. The code is posted at: https://github.com/WenddHe0119/SPMC.

This paper investigates decentralized unlearning, aiming to eliminate the impact of a specific client on the whole decentralized system. However, decentralized communication characterizations pose new challenges for effective unlearning: the indirect connections make it difficult to trace the specific client's impact, while the dynamic topology limits the scalability of retraining-based unlearning methods. In this paper, we propose the first **P**rovable **D**ecentralized **U**nlearning algorithm under **D**ynamic **T**opologies called PDUDT. It allows clients to eliminate the influence of a specific client without additional communication or retraining. We provide rigorous theoretical guarantees for PDUDT, showing it is statistically indistinguishable from perturbed retraining. Additionally, it achieves an efficient convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(\frac{1}{T})$ in subsequent learning, where $T$ is the total communication rounds. This rate matches state-of-the-art results. Experimental results show that compared with the Retrain method, PDUDT saves more than 99\% of unlearning time while achieving comparable unlearning performance.

Nash equilibrium (NE) plays an important role in game theory. How to efficiently compute an NE in NFGs is challenging due to its complexity and non-convex optimization property. Machine Learning (ML), the cornerstone of modern artificial intelligence, has demonstrated remarkable empirical performance across various applications including non-convex optimization. To leverage non-convex stochastic optimization techniques from ML for approximating an NE, various loss functions have been proposed. Among these, only one loss function is unbiased, allowing for unbiased estimation under the sampled play. Unfortunately, this loss function suffers from high variance, which degrades the convergence rate. To improve the convergence rate by mitigating the high variance associated with the existing unbiased loss function, we propose a novel surrogate loss function named Nash Advantage Loss (NAL). NAL is theoretically proved unbiased and exhibits significantly lower variance than the existing unbiased loss function. Experimental results demonstrate that the algorithm minimizing NAL achieves a significantly faster empirical convergence rates compared to other algorithms, while also reducing the variance of estimated loss value by several orders of magnitude.

A key task in certain democratic processes is to produce a concise slate of statements that proportionally represents the full spectrum of user opinions. This task is similar to committee elections, but unlike traditional settings, the candidate set comprises all possible statements of varying lengths, and so it can only be accessed through specific queries. Combining social choice and large language models, prior work has approached this challenge through a framework of generative social choice. We extend the framework in two fundamental ways, providing theoretical guarantees even in the face of approximately optimal queries and a budget limit on the overall length of the slate. Using GPT-4o to implement queries, we showcase our approach on datasets related to city improvement measures and drug reviews, demonstrating its effectiveness in generating representative slates from unstructured user opinions.