Fox in the Henhouse: Supply-Chain Backdoor Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning
Shijie Liu, Andrew Craig Cullen, Paul Montague, Sarah Monazam Erfani, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein
Existing backdoor attacks on Reinforcement Learning (RL) typically rely on unrealistic white-box access to victim parameters, rewards, or observations. Inspired by real world behaviors, we introduce the Supply-Chain Backdoor (SCAB) attack to demonstrate that such assumptions are unnecessary. SCAB targets the common practice of training with third-party policies, poisoning the dataset solely through a black-box of legitimate agent-environment interactions. With only 3% data corruption, SCAB demonstrates a peak attack success rate exceeding 90% and reduces victim returns by 80%. These findings expose a critical vulnerability in the modern RL supply chain, highlighting that reliance on untrusted external agents constitutes a severe and practical security risk.