The Invisible Hand: Regaining Control of Service Quality from Outsourced Satellite Networks

Abstract

Emerging Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations are revolutionizing global connectivity. However, deploying independent constellations for every operator is infeasible due to limited spectrum and orbital resources, leading operators (e.g., mobile network operators) to lease satellites from satellite network operators (SNOs). This outsourcing model deprives leasing operators of control over service quality, as SNOs may underdeliver without effective enforcement. We advocate: Don’t police the satellite, let the market police it. We present Ripple, turning competition into a built-in quality enforcer. Ripple empowers users to pay for desired QoS through postpaid plans or tokens, measure their runtime QoS loss induced by SNOs, and penalize underperforming SNOs through revenue loss by switching to their competitors. Ripple further empowers leasing operators to stimulate competition among SNOs via performance-adaptive agreements, incentivizing SNOs to maintain optimal service. Our game-theoretical analysis proves that the optimal strategy for SNOs to maximize their revenues is to honestly deliver the best service they can offer, enabling end-users and operators to indirectly regain control of service quality. We implement Ripple in direct-to-cell satellite networks and conduct real trace-driven large-scale simulations. Results show Ripple ensures users receive optimal service while awarding 27.7% higher revenue to SNOs consistently delivering optimal service.