Stealth migration: Hiding virtual machines on the network

Abstract

Live virtual machine (VM) migration is commonly used for enabling dynamic resource or fault management, or for load balancing in datacenters or cloud platforms. A service hosted by a VM may also be migrated to prevent its visibility to an external adversary who may seek to disrupt its operation by launching a DDoS attack against it. We first show that current systems cannot adequately hide a VM migration from an external adversary. The key reason for this is that a migration typically manifests a traffic pattern with distinguishable statistical properties. We introduce two new attacks that can allow an adversary to effectively track a migration in progress, by leveraging observations of these properties. As our primary contribution, we design and implement a stealth migration framework that causes migration traffic to be indistinguishable from regular Internet traffic, with a negligible latency overhead of approximately 0.37 seconds, on average.