Privacy Attacks

In-context learning (ICL) is an important capability of Large Language Models (LLMs), enabling these models to dynamically adapt based on specific, in-context exemplars, thereby improving accuracy and relevance. However, LLM's responses may leak the sensitive private information contained in in-context exemplars. To address this challenge, we propose Differentially Private In-context Learning (DP-ICL), a general paradigm for privatizing ICL tasks. The key idea for DP-ICL paradigm is generating differentially private responses through a noisy consensus among an ensemble of LLM's responses based on disjoint exemplar sets. Based on the general paradigm of DP-ICL, we instantiate several techniques showing how to privatize ICL for text classification and language generation. We experiment on four text classification benchmarks and two language generation tasks, and our empirical findings suggest that our DP-ICL achieves a strong utility-privacy tradeoff.

We study best arm identification (BAI) in linear bandits in the fixed-budget regime under differential privacy constraints, when the arm rewards are supported on the unit interval. Given a finite budget $T$ and a privacy parameter $\varepsilon>0$, the goal is to minimise the error probability in finding the arm with the largest mean after $T$ sampling rounds, subject to the constraint that the policy of the decision maker satisfies a certain {\em $\varepsilon$-differential privacy} ($\varepsilon$-DP) constraint. We construct a policy satisfying the $\varepsilon$-DP constraint (called {\sc DP-BAI}), based on the principle of {\em maximum absolute determinants}, and derive an upper bound on its error probability. Furthermore, we derive a minimax lower bound on the error probability, and demonstrate that the lower and the upper bounds decay exponentially in $T$, with exponents in the two bounds matching order-wise in (a) the sub-optimality gaps of the arms, (b) $\varepsilon$, and (c) the problem complexity that is expressible as the sum of two terms, one characterising the complexity of standard fixed-budget BAI (without privacy constraints), and the other accounting for the $\varepsilon$-DP constraint. Additionally, we present some auxiliary results that contribute to the derivation of the lower bound on the error probability. These results, we posit, may be of independent interest and could prove instrumental in proving lower bounds on error probabilities in several other bandit problems. Whereas prior works provide results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime without privacy constraints or in the fixed-confidence regime with privacy constraints, our work fills the gap in the literature by providing the results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime under the $\varepsilon$-DP constraint.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have came to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we introduce a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as $\textbf{data-constrained backdoor attacks}$. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the $\textbf{entanglement}$ between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: $\textit{Clean Feature Suppression}$ and $\textit{Poisoning Feature Augmentation}$. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over $\textbf{100}$% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios.

Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent with Gradient Clipping (DPSGD-GC) is a powerful tool for training deep learning models using sensitive data, providing both a solid theoretical privacy guarantee and high efficiency. However, existing research has shown that DPSGD-GC only converges when using large clipping thresholds that are dependent on problem-specific parameters that are often unknown in practice. Therefore, DPSGD-GC suffers from degraded performance due to the {\it constant} bias introduced by the clipping. In our work, we propose a new error-feedback (EF) DP algorithm as an alternative to DPSGD-GC, which offers a diminishing utility bound without inducing a constant clipping bias. More importantly, it allows for an arbitrary choice of clipping threshold that is independent of the problem. We establish an algorithm-specific DP analysis for our proposed algorithm, providing privacy guarantees based on R{\'e}nyi DP. And we demonstrate that under mild conditions, our algorithm can achieve the same utility bound as DPSGD without gradient clipping. Our empirical results on standard datasets show that the proposed algorithm achieves higher accuracies than DPSGD while maintaining the same level of DP guarantee.

Given a prompt, language models produce a distribution over all possible next tokens; when the prompt is unknown, can we use this distributional information to recover the prompt? We consider the problem of anguage model inversion and show that next-token probabilities contain a surprising amount of information about the preceding text. Often we can recover the text in cases where it is hidden from the user, motivating a method for recovering unknown prompts given only the model's current distribution output. We consider a variety of model access scenarios, and show how even without predictions for every token in the vocabulary we can recover the probability vector through search and reconstruction of the input. On LLAMA-7B, our inversion method reconstructs prompts with a BLEU of $59$ and token-level F1 of $77$ and recovers $23\%$ of prompts exactly

Gradient inversion attacks aim to reconstruct local training data from intermediate gradients exposed in the federated learning framework. Despite successful attacks, all previous methods, starting from reconstructing a single data point and then relaxing the single-image limit to batch level, are only tested under hard label constraints. Even for single-image reconstruction, we still lack an analysis-based algorithm to recover augmented soft labels. In this work, we change the focus from enlarging batchsize to investigating the hard label constraints, considering a more realistic circumstance where label smoothing and mixup techniques are used in the training process. In particular, we are the first to initiate a novel algorithm to simultaneously recover the ground-truth augmented label and the input feature of the last fully-connected layer from single-input gradients, and provide a necessary condition for any analytical-based label recovery methods. Extensive experiments testify to the label recovery accuracy, as well as the benefits to the following image reconstruction. We believe soft labels in classification tasks are worth further attention in gradient inversion attacks.

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a \textit{significant} privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new \emph{practical} data extraction attack that we call ``neural phishing''. This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of $10\%$ attack success rates, at times, as high as $50\%$. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as $10$s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

Fairness-aware graph neural networks (GNNs) have gained a surge of attention as they can reduce the bias of predictions on any demographic group (e.g., female) in graph-based applications. Although these methods greatly improve the algorithmic fairness of GNNs, the fairness can be easily corrupted by carefully designed adversarial attacks. In this paper, we investigate the problem of adversarial attacks on fairness of GNNs and propose G-FairAttack, a general framework for attacking various types of fairness-aware GNNs in terms of fairness with an unnoticeable effect on prediction utility. In addition, we propose a fast computation technique to reduce the time complexity of G-FairAttack. The experimental study demonstrates that G-FairAttack successfully corrupts the fairness of different types of GNNs while keeping the attack unnoticeable. Our study on fairness attacks sheds light on potential vulnerabilities in fairness-aware GNNs and guides further research on the robustness of GNNs in terms of fairness.

We introduce new jailbreak attacks on vision language models (VLMs), which use aligned LLMs and are resilient to text-only jailbreak attacks. Specifically, we develop cross-modality attacks on alignment where we pair adversarial images going through the vision encoder with textual prompts to break the alignment of the language model. Our attacks employ a novel compositional strategy that combines an image, adversarially targeted towards toxic embeddings, with generic prompts to accomplish the jailbreak. Thus, the LLM draws the context to answer the generic prompt from the adversarial image. The generation of benign-appearing adversarial images leverages a novel embedding-space-based methodology, operating with no access to the LLM model. Instead, the attacks require access only to the vision encoder and utilize one of our four embedding space targeting strategies. By not requiring access to the LLM, the attacks lower the entry barrier for attackers, particularly when vision encoders such as CLIP are embedded in closed-source LLMs. The attacks achieve a high success rate across different VLMs, highlighting the risk of cross-modality alignment vulnerabilities, and the need for new alignment approaches for multi-modal models.

Large language models (LLMs) often demonstrate inconsistencies with human preferences. Previous research typically gathered human preference data and then aligned the pre-trained models using reinforcement learning or instruction tuning, a.k.a. the finetuning step. In contrast, aligning frozen LLMs without requiring alignment data is more appealing. This work explores the potential of the latter setting. We discover that by integrating self-evaluation and rewind mechanisms, unaligned LLMs can directly produce responses consistent with human preferences via self-boosting. We introduce a novel inference method, Rewindable Auto-regressive INference (RAIN), that allows pre-trained LLMs to evaluate their own generation and use the evaluation results to guide rewind and generation for AI safety. Notably, RAIN operates without the need of extra data for model alignment and abstains from any training, gradient computation, or parameter updates. Experimental results evaluated by GPT-4 and humans demonstrate the effectiveness of RAIN: on the HH dataset, RAIN improves the harmlessness rate of LLaMA 30B from 82% of vanilla inference to 97%, while maintaining the helpfulness rate. On the TruthfulQA dataset, RAIN improves the truthfulness of the already-well-aligned LLaMA-2-chat 13B model by 5%.

Adversarial patch attacks, where a small patch is placed in the scene to fool neural networks, have been studied for numerous applications. Focusing on image classification, we consider the setting of a black-box transfer attack where an attacker does not know the target model. Instead of forcing corrupted image representations to cross the nearest decision boundaries or converge to a particular point, we propose a distribution-oriented approach. We rely on optimal transport to push the feature distribution of attacked images towards an already modeled distribution. We show that this new distribution-oriented approach leads to better transferable patches. Through digital experiments conducted on ImageNet-1K, we provide evidence that our new patches are the only ones that can simultaneously influence multiple Transformer models and Convolutional Neural Networks. Physical world experiments demonstrate that our patch can affect systems in deployment without explicit knowledge.

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning technique where multiple devices (such as smartphones or IoT devices) train a shared global model by using their local data. FL claims that the data privacy of local participants is preserved well because local data will not be shared with either the server-side or other training participants. However, this paper discovers a pioneering finding that a model inversion (MI) attacker, who acts as a benign participant, can invert the shared global model and obtain the data belonging to other participants. This will lead to severe data-leakage risk in FL because it is difficult to identify attackers from benign participants. In addition, we found even the most advanced defense approaches could not effectively address this issue. Therefore, it is important to evaluate such data-leakage risks of an FL system before using it. To alleviate this issue, we propose FedInverse to evaluate whether the FL global model can be inverted by MI attackers. In particular, FedInverse can be optimized by leveraging the Hilbert-Schmidt independence criterion (HSIC) as a regularizer to adjust the diversity of the MI attack generator. We test FedInverse with three typical MI attackers, GMI, KED-MI, and VMI, and the experiments show our FedInverse method can successfully obtain the data belonging to other participants. The code of this work is available at https://github.com/Jun-B0518/FedInverse

Adversarial robustness is an important standard for measuring the quality of learned models, and adversarial training is an effective strategy for improving the adversarial robustness of models. In this paper, we disclose that adversarially trained models are vulnerable to two-faced attacks, where slight perturbations in input features are crafted to make the model exhibit a false sense of robustness in the verification phase. Such a threat is significantly important as it can mislead our evaluation of the adversarial robustness of models, which could cause unpredictable security issues when deploying substandard models in reality. More seriously, this threat seems to be pervasive and tricky: we find that many types of models suffer from this threat, and models with higher adversarial robustness tend to be more vulnerable. Furthermore, we provide the first attempt to formulate this threat, disclose its relationships with adversarial risk, and try to circumvent it via a simple countermeasure. These findings serve as a crucial reminder for practitioners to exercise caution in the verification phase, urging them to refrain from blindly trusting the exhibited adversarial robustness of models.

Malicious server (MS) attacks have enabled the scaling of data stealing in federated learning to large batch sizes and secure aggregation, settings previously considered private. However, many concerns regarding the client-side detectability of MS attacks were raised, questioning their practicality. In this work, for the first time, we thoroughly study client-side detectability. We first demonstrate that all prior MS attacks are detectable by principled checks, and formulate a necessary set of requirements that a practical MS attack must satisfy. Next, we propose SEER, a novel attack framework that satisfies these requirements. The key insight of SEER is the use of a secret decoder, jointly trained with the shared model. We show that SEER can steal user data from gradients of realistic networks, even for large batch sizes of up to 512 and under secure aggregation. Our work is a promising step towards assessing the true vulnerability of federated learning in real-world settings.

Current privacy research on large language models (LLMs) primarily focuses on the issue of extracting memorized training data. At the same time, models’ inference capabilities have increased drastically. This raises the key question of whether current LLMs could violate individuals’ privacy by inferring personal attributes from text given at inference time. In this work, we present the first comprehensive study on the capabilities of pretrained LLMs to infer personal attributes from text. We construct a dataset consisting of real Reddit profiles, and show that current LLMs can infer a wide range of personal attributes (e.g., location, income, sex), achieving up to 85% top-1 and 95% top-3 accuracy at a fraction of the cost (100x) and time (240x) required by humans. As people increasingly interact with LLM-powered chatbots across all aspects of life, we also explore the emerging threat of privacy-invasive chatbots trying to extract personal information through seemingly benign questions. Finally, we show that common mitigations, i.e., text anonymization and model alignment, are currently ineffective at protecting user privacy against LLM inference. Our findings highlight that current LLMs can infer personal data at a previously unattainable scale. In the absence of working defenses, we advocate for a broader discussion around LLM privacy implications beyond memorization, striving for stronger and wider privacy protection.

We introduce a novel approach to counter adversarial attacks, namely, image resampling. Image resampling transforms a discrete image into a new one, simulating the process of scene recapturing or rerendering as specified by a geometrical transformation. The underlying rationale behind our idea is that image resampling can alleviate the influence of adversarial perturbations while preserving essential semantic information, thereby conferring an inherent advantage in defending against adversarial attacks. To validate this concept, we present a comprehensive study on leveraging image resampling to defend against adversarial attacks. We have developed basic resampling methods that employ interpolation strategies and coordinate shifting magnitudes. Our analysis reveals that these basic methods can partially mitigate adversarial attacks. However, they come with apparent limitations: the accuracy of clean images noticeably decreases, while the improvement in accuracy on adversarial examples is not substantial.We propose implicit representation-driven image resampling (IRAD) to overcome these limitations. First, we construct an implicit continuous representation that enables us to represent any input image within a continuous coordinate space. Second, we introduce SampleNet, which automatically generates pixel-wise shifts for resampling in response to different inputs. Furthermore, we can extend our approach to the state-of-the-art diffusion-based method, accelerating it with fewer time steps while preserving its defense capability. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the adversarial robustness of diverse deep models against various attacks while maintaining high accuracy on clean images.

We study deceptive fairness attacks on graphs to answer the following question: How can we achieve poisoning attacks on a graph learning model to exacerbate the bias deceptively? We answer this question via a bi-level optimization problem and propose a meta learning-based framework named FATE. FATE is broadly applicable with respect to various fairness definitions and graph learning models, as well as arbitrary choices of manipulation operations. We further instantiate FATE to attack statistical parity or individual fairness on graph neural networks. We conduct extensive experimental evaluations on real-world datasets in the task of semi-supervised node classification. The experimental results demonstrate that FATE could amplify the bias of graph neural networks with or without fairness consideration while maintaining the utility on the downstream task. We hope this paper provides insights into the adversarial robustness of fair graph learning and can shed light on designing robust and fair graph learning in future studies.

Dataset distillation offers a potential means to enhance data efficiency in deep learning. Recent studies have shown its ability to counteract backdoor risks present in original training samples. In this study, we delve into the theoretical aspects of backdoor attacks and dataset distillation based on kernel methods. We introduce two new theory-driven trigger pattern generation methods specialized for dataset distillation. Following a comprehensive set of analyses and experiments, we show that our optimization-based trigger design framework informs effective backdoor attacks on dataset distillation. Notably, datasets poisoned by our designed trigger prove resilient against conventional backdoor attack detection and mitigation methods. Our empirical results validate that the triggers developed using our approaches are proficient at executing resilient backdoor attacks.

The interest in federated learning has surged in recent research due to its unique ability to train a global model using privacy-secured information held locally on each client. This paper pays particular attention to the issue of client-side model heterogeneity, a pervasive challenge in the practical implementation of FL that escalates its complexity. Assuming a scenario where each client possesses varied memory storage, processing capabilities and network bandwidth - a phenomenon referred to as system heterogeneity - there is a pressing need to customize a unique model for each client. In response to this, we present an effective and adaptable federated framework FedP3, representing Federated Personalized and Privacy-friendly network Pruning, tailored for model heterogeneity scenarios. Our proposed methodology can incorporate and adapt well-established techniques to its specific instances. We offer a theoretical interpretation of FedP3 and its locally differential-private variant, DP-FedP3, and theoretically validate their efficiencies.